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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
The Impact of Cash Transfers on Labor Force Participation
and Household Consumption: Evidence from Post-Apartheid
South Africa
The Old Age Pension (OAP) program for elderly South Africans puts a significant
cash transfer in the hands of many poor households. This dissertation investigates
its impact on labor force participation and consumption of selected household items.
In the first half of the dissertation, we take advantage of a policy reform that lowered
men’s OAP eligibility age from 65 to 60 for men to match that of women for estima-
tion identification. Using the General Household Survey data, we first demonstrate
that both men and women respond to the eligibility age by dropping from labor force
participation at the eligibility age, as expected. Using a difference-in-difference-in-
difference estimator, we estimate that at the median predicted wage, age eligibility
reduces men’s probability of labor force participation by approximately 6.14 percent-
age points.
Previous studies show that not only is the OAP take-up rate high among the age-
eligible, but its value is sufficiently high to generally make it a significant component
of total household income for the majority of pensioners and their households. Other
studies add that it is a dominant source of income in older households, such that
it is often the sole source of income in these households, especially those in rural
areas. In the second half of the dissertation, therefore, we examine the impact of age-
eligibility status on a number of selected household outcomes, such as food security,
sanitation, source of drinking water, and ownership of consumer durable goods. We
also examine the extent to which gender influences its impact on household outcomes.
We find positive effects on a select number of outcomes; however, we note this is more
associated with females’ age-eligibility status, but not that of males.
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Motivation
One of the features of the last decade has been the emergence of large social transfers
in middle- and low-income countries aimed at providing direct cash to individuals or
households in extreme and persistent poverty; rough estimates indicate that between
0.75-1 billion individuals have access to social transfers (Barrientos, 2012). These
cash transfer programs show diversity in design. For instance, Progresa in Mexico is
conditional on school attendance and primary healthcare utilization with the aim of
reducing intergenerational poverty persistence, while others, like the South African
Old Age Pension (OAP) program, our program of interest, are purely cash trans-
fers. The significance of these cash transfers is highlighted by the fact that they are
predictable and they provide recipients with the flexibility to meet their basic needs.
South Africa’s social assistance program is exceptional among developing coun-
tries, and is a vital pillar in the country’s highly re-distributive social policies (Van der
Berg and Bredenkamp, 2002; Seekings, 2002). In South Africa, social assistance grants
reach approximately half of all households (Barrientos, 2012). Through the OAP, for
instance, the South African government provides a monthly cash transfer to older
individuals that is substantially higher than the median per capita income (Arding-
ton et al., 2009). Its relevance is also underscored by the fact that over two-thirds of
the older population report receiving the pension (Sienaert, 2008; Woolard and Leib-
brandt, 2013). Other studies find that the OAP accounts for more than 85% of total
household income in households receiving the pension in urban areas, while 25% of
households in rural areas that receive the pension report it as their only income. The
size of the pension and the magnitude of its reach implies that it has the potential to
impact both individuals and households significantly.
This dissertation works to examine the impact of such large cash transfers on
labor force participation and household’s consumption using the South African Old
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Age Pension (OAP) program. We proceed with the dissertation as follows. Chapter
2 describes the South African social security system, including the Old Age Pension
(OAP). We detail the eligibility criteria, including a change in the minimum age-
eligibility requirement for males. Historically, the minimum age-eligibility require-
ment for women was 60 while that of men was 65. In 2008 a pension reform lowered,
in steps, men’s minimum age-eligibility from 65 to 60, during which the government
extended pensions to men aged 63 and older in 2008, and later to those aged 61 and
older in 2009, and finally to those aged 60 and older in 2010, thus equaling that of
women. We exploit this phased-in reduction of pension age-eligibility for estimation
identification.
Existing studies on the impact of South Africa’s pension, while the program
is primarily targeted to the elderly poor, has given little specific attention to the
labor market behaviors of the elderly. Most of these studies have predominately
focused on the outcomes of other household members typically due to the fact that
the majority of the elderly live in three-generation and skip-generation households
(Case and Deaton, 1998). For instance, as low as 7% of pensioners live without at
least one 19-50 year old, while the percentage of children that live with a pensioner
has historically been high, especially among poor households (Sagner and Mtati,
1999). These studies have focused on at least one of the following questions: first,
the effect on child outcomes, such as child labor, school attendance and completion,
and child nutrition–typically defined by some measure of height-for-age and weight-
for-height, amongst others (Duflo, 2000; Edmonds, 2006). Secondly, studies have
focused on the effect on household composition, resource allocation, decision making,
and remittances (Hamoudi and Thomas, 2014; Case and Deaton, 1998; Ambler, 2015;
Ranchhod, 2009). Finally, focuses on the effect on labor supply and employment of
prime-aged adults that reside with the pensioners in these studies have provided mixed
results (Bertrand et al., 2003; Posel et al., 2006; Ardington et al., 2007; Abel, 2013).
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However, given the considerable focus on the effect of the pension on non-elderly
outcomes, there is relatively less work on labor market behavior of the beneficiaries
themselves, and we are aware of only two previous studies by Lam et al. (2006) and
Ranchhod (2006) that examine potential labor force supply effect on elderly South
Africans.
Overall, there is substantial literature that has examined the impact of social
security benefits on labor force participation in developed countries. In the United
States, for example, a host of these studies attribute the decline in labor force partic-
ipation among older men over the past half-century to jobs covered by social security
as well as its increasing share of household income among household heads aged 65
and older (Diamond and Gruber, 1999; Hurd, 1990; Burtless and Moffitt, 1984)1 How-
ever, policy implication from these studies may have relatively limited relevance for
developing countries due in part to the fact that these countries are different in a
number of ways. For instance, they have low income levels, less-developed finan-
cial markets, their production relies heavily on labor, low life expectancy, and the
structure of households–wherein family is the primary care provider for the elderly
population (Kaushal, 2014). In the context of South Africa, most of the elderly pop-
ulation faces a complex set of challenges. For instance, they are less educated and
the majority of the blacks spent most of their productive lives under the apartheid
1 Hurd (1990) notes that a peak in the hazard rate of retirement at age 62, the earliest age of
retirement, offers another piece of evidence that social security has a significant effect on retirement
behaviors, also adding that there ”are no other institutional or economic reasons for the peak”;
similar spikes in retirement at age 62 in 1960, when men were not allowed to draw benefits before
age 65, are not observed (Burtless and Moffitt, 1984). Gruber and Wise (2004), in a 12-country
study (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom, and United States) documents a strong association between pension eligibility and
retirement behaviors, finding that Social Security reforms that delay benefits eligibility discourages
retirement. Specifically, they find that reforms that delay eligibility age by 3 years reduce labor
force participation of men aged 56-65 by between 23% and 36%. There are however other studies
that offer other explanations for the observed early retirement in males. For instance, Costa (1998)
discusses that since the downward trend in men’s labor force participation was observed prior to the
establishment of social security programs, it could have been the result of several factors, such as
better social/economic conditions, leisure opportunities and economic development.
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restrictions on employment. Therefore, they were not able to accumulate enough
wealth to support themselves in their old age and are subjected to credit constraint
(Edmonds, 2006). We explore this line of research further by examining the impact of
pension age-eligibility on the labor force participation of elderly South African males
in chapter 3.
Significant to this dissertation is the South African household structure wherein
families tend to live in multi-generation or skip-generation household arrangements.
Household structure, particularly among black South Africans, was historically re-
lied upon for provision of care and food for the elderly. However, due to high cases
of HIV/AIDS and high unemployment rates that have weakened prime-aged adults’
ability to support their families, household structure has now taken on a new impor-
tance; roles have reversed so that the elderly now support the younger generation
(Lam et al., 2006). Ambler (2015) and Case and Menendez (2007) observe that ap-
proximately 40% and 11% of children under 5 years live with women and men above
50 years old, respectively, and it is also estimated that more than 50% of elderly
adults live with at least one younger women. As a result, evidence shows that the
impact of these cash transfers tends to extend to other household members as well.
Consequently, in Chapter 4, we examine the impact of OAP on food security for both
adults and children.
We extend this analysis to examine age-eligibility impact on water, sanitation,
and ownership of durable goods. While water and sanitation are not necessary areas
of concern in the United States or in other western countries, study show they are
severely deficient in developing countries, and consequently become major public
health issues. While the correlation between the lack of water (improved), improved
sanitation and health is complex, diseases transmitted through poor quality water
or poor human waste disposal are well documented in literature (Esrey et al., 1991).
A major constraint for households wanting to connect to improved water supply,
4
for example, is affordability, and we hypothesis that pension income may ease this
constraint, therefore resulting in better access to improved water supply. Findings
from this chapter indicate that females’ age-eligibility has a positive impact on the
selected number of outcomes, but we do not observe any significant impact from that
of males.
Finally, chapter 5 concludes the dissertation and discusses possible extensions
for further research.
Copyright c© Steve M. M. Muchiri, 2016.
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Chapter 2 The South Africa’s Old Age Pension (OAP) Program
2.1 A Brief Background
South Africa’s social security has three elements; Figure 2.1 provides a schematic:
a statutory contributory system, a voluntary scheme and a social grant (social as-
sistance grant). The statutory contributory system consists of employment-related
funds and benefits are dependent on contributions: the Compensation Funds provide
medical care and income benefits to workers injured at work or those who develop
occupational diseases, the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) pays benefits to its
contributors in case of unemployment, illness, maternity, or adoption of a child, and
also pays benefits to the dependents in case of death in service. It is mandatory for all
private-sector/formal-sector workers and their employers. The Road Accident Fund
provides compensation for loss of earnings and damages to victims of road accidents
caused by negligent driving (Woolard et al., 2010). The voluntary system consists
of private savings and is mostly used to supplement retirement income from other
pension funds.
The State Old Age Pension, commonly referred to as the OAP, falls under the
social grants prong. In South Africa, the term “social grants” is used to refer to
means-tested programs that are provided by the government to vulnerable groups
with no contribution requirements. Other major social assistance programs provided
by the South African government include: the Disability Grant (DG)–intended for
individuals aged 18 to 59 years who are temporarily or permanently unable to obtain
gainful employment due to a disability or a chronic illness; the Child Support Grant
(CSG)–for individuals under 18 that reside with low-income caregivers; the Foster
Care Grant (FSG)–for children that have been placed under foster parents by order
of the court; the Care Dependency Grant (CDG); the War Veteran Grant–for Second
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World War and Korean War veterans; and the Grant in Aid–for OAP, Disability
Grant or War Veteran Grant recipients who require full-time attendance.1 These
social assistance programs are financed out of general taxes revenues and therefore one
does not need to contribute in order to receive benefits. Since only individuals with
continued formal employment are covered by the contributory based programs, OAP
plays a major role providing basic income support for the majority who do not have
continued formal employment and therefore do not have access to the contributory
social insurance programs.
As is often the case, demand for provision of social pensions is driven by poverty
among the elderly as well the breakdown in living arrangements (multi-generation),
wherein younger individuals are either no longer able or willing to provide care for
their aging parents (Case and Deaton, 1998). However, forces behind social pen-
sion provision in South Africa are different from those observed in other developing
countries. OAP is the most unique and important feature of the South African so-
cial assistance system and has an interesting history, having evolved from a grant
that was exlusively paid to white South Africans to one that is now paid to all South
Africans regardless of their race (Lam et al., 2006). However, Case and Deaton (1998)
points out that OAP was a ”largely unintended consequence of the country’s recent
history”. Since the majority of white workers were covered by private occupational
pension schemes, OAP, a means-tested state pension, was originally introduced in
1928 with the primary objective of providing a safety-net for poor elderly whites who
had reached retirement without sufficient provision from private occupational pension
1Implementation of social grants in South Africa is under the South African Social Security
Agency (SASSA). A total of 15.7 million people were receiving some type of social grant from the
government in 2011-2012, out of a total population of roughly 49 million, and over a half of these
were children receiving the child support grant (Woolard and Leibbrandt, 2013). The Old Age
Pension program has the highest expenditure; it accounts for 8% of the country’s expenditure and
the increasingly large number of of individuals achieving its eligibility age each year and claiming
the pension benefits raises concern about its long-term sustainability (Ferreira, 2000).
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schemes, and it was subject to both age and means test (Sagner and Mtati, 1999;
Case and Deaton, 1998).
In 1944 the system was extended to Africans/blacks, but still pension amounts
were legally determined by race and were not comparable to those of the white
population, i.e., means-testing and benefit levels were different for different racial
groups. The distribution system was different as well. Whites’ pensions were dis-
tributed through the postal office, while Africans’/blacks’ pensions were distributed
through mobile pay points that did not reach most of the rural areas. In addi-
tion, officials would regularly and intentionally underestimate the age of prospective
Africans/blacks or otherwise take beneficiaries off the benefits list in order to save on
the cost of the pensions (Duflo, 2003).
By 1958, while the fraction of the African/black population that depended on
the OAP made up the majority of the pensioners, their total receipt was only 19%
of the total OAP spending (Van der Berg, 1997), despite benefits being independent
of previous earnings. By the early 1980s, benefits for whites were approximately 10
times more than those for Africans/blacks (Lund, 1993). From the late 1970s and
onwards, fiscal expenditure on social assistance rose faster in the effort to integrate
all race groups into the system with similar levels of benefits. Fiscal spending on
OAP increased from 0.6 percent of GDP in 1970 to 1.8 percent by 1993, but fiscal
constraints restricted the government from increasing non-whites’ benefits levels to
those previously obtained by white pensioners. Consequently, as shown in Figure 2.2,
non-whites’ benefits rose rapidly in real terms between the early 1970s and 1993 while
that of whites fell and eventually equaled that of the former. This period is marked
by the Social Assistance Act of 1992 that did away with all discriminatory provisions
and provided steps towards pension parity, which was finally achieved in 1993, a year
before South Africa’s first democratic elections (Ranchhod, 2009).
The expansion of the program made it more likely for qualifying blacks to receive
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the pension and in 1993, approximately 80% of black men and women above 65 and
60, respectively received the pension while the rest either earned above the qualifying
income threshold and therefore could not qualify or were unable to access the system.
At this time the maximum benefit of R370 (approximately 90 U.S dollars per month)
was about twice the median income per capita in rural areas where majority of the
blacks resided (Duflo, 2000).
Whereas the minimum pension age-eligibility had historically been at 60 years
for women and 65 for men, a 2008 pension reform lowered, in steps, men’s minimum
pension age requirement from 65 to 60 years. During that transition period, the
government extended pensions to men aged 63 and older in 2008, and later to men
aged 61 and older in 2009. In 2010, it had equaled that of women at 60 (Ambler,
2015; Lombard and Kruger, 2009). The reform in eligibility age was a result of
a South African High Court case in which four male applicants succeeded in their
argument that the difference in pension age requirements between men and women
discriminated against them unfairly on the ground of age and gender (Lombard and
Kruger, 2009). As per the South African Social Assistance Amendment Act, no. 6
of 2008, which made provision for a phased-in change, pension age requirements were
amended as follows: One was deemed pension age-eligible if (i) after 1 April 2008,
one had attained the age of 63 years; (ii) after 1 April 2009, one had attained the age
of 61 years; or (iii) after 1 April 2010, one had attained the age of 60 years2.
2.2 Eligibility Requirements
The Old-Age Pension is a non-contributory pension which, at the time of this anal-
ysis, paid a maximum amount of R1410 per month (roughly $100 US).3 In principle,
the pension is subject to both means and assets tests and a qualifying individual
2Consequences of this reform are evident in Figure 3.3 and 3.4
31 U.S dollar for 13.69 South African Rand as per September 8, 2015.
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receives the maximum amount if within a certain income/assets threshold–the “disre-
gard level”–and thereafter the pension amount is gradually reduced to zero as other
income and assets increase. The means and assets tests apply to couples as if their
joint income is equally divided between two single persons; however, non-spousal
income and assets do not count.
However, McEwen et al. (2009) explains that in practice, only income is assessed
due to difficulties with the valuation of assets. Additionally, it seems more likely that
the means test is only used to determine whether one qualifies to receive the pension,
and those who qualify tend to receive the maximum amount (Case and Deaton, 1998;
Ranchhod, 2009; Ardington et al., 2009).4 This is also evident in Figure 2.3, which
plots the distribution of pension amount received in 2008, 2010, and 2012 using data
from the National Income Dynamics Survey (NIDS).5 As is visible in the Figure, the
distribution of pension benefits seems to be concentrated at certain amount–around
R900 in 2008, R1,100 in 2010, and R1,200 in 2012. These are approximately the
maximum benefit amounts in the month and year of the survey.
Multiple members of the same household can receive pensions simultaneously;
therefore, there are no direct incentives to change the composition of the household or
to change non-spousal employment activities in order to be pension-eligible. Further,
eligibility requirements do not stipulate that recipients are not allowed to work. In
fact, Ranchhod (2009) finds that the majority of individuals who are age-eligible for
the pension would probably continue to work and still be under the income eligibility
threshold, as they are less educated and have low earning potential. It may therefore
4Using the 2000 Income and Expenditure Survey, Hamoudi and Thomas (2014) also find that
although the amount of the benefits is designed to vary with the means of the recipient, the generosity
of the means test made it that among those who reported any positive pension income, over 90%
reported receiving the maximum allowable amount.
5NIDS is a nationally representative longitudinal data conducted by the South African Labor and
Development Research Unit (SALDRU). It collects data on a wide range of indicators such as labor
outcome, household composition, education and health, economic activities, welfare participation,
and household expenditures, and uses the same sampling design as the GHS.
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be desirable to continue working even when receiving the pension.
The South African Department of Social Welfare also stipulates that applicants
have to be South African citizens, or permanent residents, who live in South Africa
and are not cared for by any state institution such as a rehabilitation center, prison,
or state old age home. One also needs to not be receiving any other government
grant. It may take up to 3 months to process pension applications, but if approved,
one gets paid from the application date. The pension is paid each month by cash
at a designated location on a particular day (primarily due to limited access to the
banking system in rural areas) or through electronic transfers into a bank or Postbank
account if the recipient has a bank account, or through other institutions (e.g., old
age homes). The pensioner continues to receive the pension for as long as s/he is
alive and continues to satisfy the means test.
2.3 Data
Our data are taken from two sources: (1) South Africa’s General Household Survey
(herein referred to as GHS) and (2) National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS). The
GHSs are general-purpose nationally representative household survey conducted an-
nually by the statistics South Africa (Stats SA). It is a multi stage stratified sample,
which interviews approximately 47,000-51,000 individuals spanning across all nine
provinces of the country. The GHS master plan sample is drawn from the 1995 Cen-
sus data. While it is representative of the country, persons in collective living quarters
such as in student hostels, nursing homes, hospitals, prisons and military barracks
are not surveyed; however, it does cover residents in workers’ hostels. GHS began in
2002 as a replacement for the South Africa’s October Household Survey (OHS) which
had been conducted since 1993, but terminated in 1999 due to financial constraints.
The introduction of GHS was meant to meet the subsequent need that was felt for a
survey which collected data on the effect of government programs as well as the level
11
of development across the country (Eyal and Woolard, 2013).
We pool 7 cross sections (2006-2012) of the GHS data. Annual GHS are in two
files namely: (1) person file, and (2) House file. The Person file contains standard
demographic characteristics such as gender, marital status, age, race, education at-
tainment, unemployment status, province of residence, access to social services, and
health. Households characteristic data, such as household size, head of household,
household expenditure, family composition, dwelling type, access to water and sani-
tation, access to services, transport, and household assets, and main source of income
are contained in the House file. These different files are easily linked on the basis of a
unique record identifier. The primary purpose of the survey is to measure the living
circumstances of South African households.
NIDS is South Africa’s first nationally representative panel data. The first
wave was conducted in 2008 with a sample of about 28,000 individuals and 7,3000
households. The survey collects data on a wide range of indicators such as labor
outcome, household composition, education and health, economic activities,welfare
participation, and household expenditure. Information at the household level and
individual level is collected through household questionnaires as well as an individual
adult question are for all people aged 14 and over, as well as a child survey for children
under 14. For household members not available for interviewing but residing at the
household, a proxy questionnaires is administered. Attrition can occur if household
members leave previous household. In this case, these individuals are allocated a new
ID, and are followed to their location where the adult questionnaire is administered
to them.
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2.4 Figures
Figure 2.1: Social Security in South Africa
Source: Woolard et al. (2010)
Figure 2.2: Monthly Value of Pension Benefits, by Race 1960-2010
Source: Woolard et al. (2010).
Note: Data is expressed in 2010 prices using PPP$ exchange rate of 4.67 in 2010
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of Monthly OAP Received (Amount in SA Rand)
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These figures present the observed distribution of OAP amount received for individuals
who report to be on OAP. Maximum benefits in 2008: Jan-April=R870, May-Oct=940,
Oct-Dec=960. In 2010: Jan-April 1st=1010, April 1st-Dec=1080. In 2012: Jan-April
1st=1140, April 1st-Dec=1200. The distributions are derived using National Individuals
Dynamics Survey (NIDS) for 2008, 2010, and 2010.
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Chapter 3 Measuring the Impact of Old Age Pension on Retirement
Decisions
3.1 Introduction
A race-based public pension plan was a vestige of colonial and apartheid South African
governments. As steps were taken to make it more race neutral at the end of the
apartheid era, it became clear that the pension was a very large positive wealth shock
for low-wage black South Africans as compared to many others.1 While this makes
it more likely to alleviate poverty in this group, it is also more likely to distort labor
supply. This paper investigates the latter.
Given that means-based social benefits are not randomly assigned, one of the
challenges in the empirical literature is to obtain an exogenous variation to identify
its behavioral impacts, and some of the studies that have attempted to study the
impact of old age pensions on labor supply are based on cross-sectional variation.
One limitation of this approach is that other factors such as previous income may
be correlated with both pension receipt and labor supply decisions leading to biased
estimates. Use of panel data could mitigate these issues; however, another potential
solution is to exploit a natural experiment and study behavioral responses around
the policy change. An advantage of this approach is that the policy reform generates
some exogenous variation in eligibility. With a suitable control group, to control
for common trends, we can isolate the behavioral impact of the eligibility reform.
South Africa’s Old Age Pension (OAP) system reforms in 2008 provide this natural
1While racial classifications are largely associated with South Africa’s colonial and apartheid
period, they are still in use in the country, particularly to monitor progress towards establishment
of equality. Four discrete categories are commonly used: ”whites” (people of European descent),
”coloured” (mixed races), ”Indians or Asians” (settlers from the Indian subcontinent) and ”Africans”
(people of African descent). In some cases, the distinction is only made between ”white” and ”black”
South Africans where the latter includes ”coloureds”, ”Indians or Asians” and ”Africans” (Van Zyl,
2003). This paper refers to the four racial groups as used in our data set.
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experiment and an opportunity to examine the impact of pension age-eligibility on
labor force participation
Through the OAP, the South African government provides a monthly cash trans-
fer to older individuals that is conditioned on age with a means test that is very gener-
ous to some income levels. This program is one of the most expansive cash programs
not only in South Africa, but also in developing countries (Lam et al., 2006), and
consequently there is substantial literature addressing its behavioral effects. The em-
pirical work on this program, however, has generally used 1989-1993 data,2 a period
characterized by the expansion of the pension benefits to previously disadvantaged
race groups (Legido-Quigley, 2003), and are based on cross-sectional variation for
identification. To our knowledge, our study is the first to explore the variation in
pension eligibility brought about by the South African OAP reform of 2008 to study
the impact of pension eligibility on labor force participation of the recipients. The re-
form in question reduced men’s minimum eligibility age from 65 to 60, thus extending
coverage to previously uncovered men. We rely on a recent dataset from the General
Household Survey (GHS), which begins 12 years after the apartheid era ended and
when the pension’s benefits were extended equally to all race groups.
The relevance of OAP to South Africans is underscored by, first, its high re-
cipiency rate. Approximately two-thirds of older South Africans report receiving the
pension grant (Woolard and Leibbrandt, 2013; Sienaert, 2008).3 Second, the pension
is generously high by world standards, such that it provides a cash transfer that is
almost twice the median per capita African/black income (Ardington et al., 2009).4
2See (Duflo, 2000, 2003; Bertrand et al., 2003)
3The rate is higher among Africans/blacks, such that 9 out of every 10 age-eligible black South
African men and women report that they receive the pension grant (Ambler, 2015). Approximately
4.1 million South Africans are 60 years and older (about 7.8% of the South African population (SSA,
2013)) and 2.7 million of them receive the pension.
4Woolard and Leibbrandt (2013) states that the monthly amount of 1080 South African Rand
(R1080) corresponds to about 175% of median per capita monthly wage in South Africa. Møller
and Ferreira (2003) show that the pension is a significant source of income in older households, such
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Hamoudi and Thomas (2014) find that it also accounts for more than 85 percent of
total household income in African/black households receiving the pension in urban
areas, and in rural areas more than 25 percent of the African/black households re-
ceiving a pension report it as their only income. As such the pension has potential
to influence behavioral changes in important ways.
To briefly review the results,we find that not surprisingly there is a sharp discon-
tinuity in pension receipt at the eligibility age. We also find a strong and significant
negative effect of pension age eligibility on labor force participation. Specifically,
our preferred difference-in-difference (DD) and difference-in-difference-in-difference
(DDD) estimator indicate that, at the median predicted wage, pension age eligibility
reduces the likelihood of labor force participation in males by approximately 10.09
and 6.14 percentage points, respectively from a base of approximately 45 percent.
Our findings compare well with the previous studies that also find older individuals
choose to retire the higher the generosity of the pension program.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 summarizes previous find-
ings from South Africa and other countries, and section 3.3 describes the theoretical
model and predicted effects, while sections 3.4 and 3.5 describe the data used and our
empirical strategy, respectively. Section 3.6 discusses the results and finally section
3.7 concludes.
3.2 The Literature
There is substantial literature on social security benefits and their effect on labor
force participation in developed countries. A part of these examines the effect of the
age eligibility on labor retirement behaviors. Gruber and Wise (2004), for example,
in a 12-country study (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
that it is often the only source of income in these households, particularly those in rural areas.
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Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States) document a
strong association between pension-eligibility and retirement behaviors, finding that
government retirement plan reforms that delay benefits eligibility reduces retirement.
Specifically, they find that reforms that delay eligibility age by 3 years reduce labor
force non-participation of men aged 56-65 by between 23% and 36%. Hurd (1990)
notes that a peak in the hazard rate of retirement at age 62, the earliest age of retire-
ment, offers another piece of evidence in that the US Social Security has a significant
effect on retirement behaviors, also adding that there “are no other institutional or
economic reasons for the peak”; similar spikes in retirement at age 62 in 1960, when
men were not allowed to draw benefits before age 65, are not observed (Burtless and
Moffitt, 1984).5
However, despite these findings, these studies may offer relatively limited guid-
ance for developing countries because they are different in a number of ways: income
levels are much lower; credit constraints may be more stringent due to undeveloped
financial markets; labor intensity is higher; life expectancy is lower; and the structure
of household is one wherein the family is the primary care provider for the older pop-
ulation (Kaushal, 2014). Nonetheless, there is relatively less research on the impact
of pensions on beneficiary’s labor supply in developing countries. In the context of
South Africa, for example, most older persons likely face a complex set of conditions
as noted above, i.e., low income, credit constraints, family connections.
Many studies of South Africa’s OAP focus on the outcomes of other household
members and not on the pension recipients, primarily due to the prevalence of multi-
generational households. These studies tend to focus on school attainment and child
5There are, however, other studies that offer other explanations for the observed early retirement
in males. For instance, Costa (1998) discusses that since the downward trend in men’s labor force
participation was observed prior to the establishment of social security programs, it could have
been a result of several factors, such as better social/economic conditions, leisure opportunities and
economic development.
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labor (Edmonds, 2006); children’s nutrition (Duflo, 2003); household composition,
resource allocation, decision making, and remittances (Hamoudi and Thomas, 2014;
Case and Deaton, 1998; Ambler, 2015; Ranchhod, 2009); and labor supply of prime-
age co-residents (Bertrand et al., 2003; Posel et al., 2006; Ardington et al., 2009).
However, for OAP, there is relatively less work on labor market behavior of the
beneficiaries. We are aware of two recent studies that address this issue (Ranchhod,
2006; Lam et al., 2006). Both find that labor force participation rates fall sharply
at the eligibility age. The latter of the two applies a regression discontinuity design
and conservatively estimates that access to pension decreases the probability of labor
force participation by 8.4 percentage points for African/black elderly men and 12.6
percentage points in African/black women.
Many Studies of South Africa’s Old-Age pension focus on the outcomes of house-
hold members.6 In regard to children living with the pensioners, (Edmonds, 2006)
finds that pension eligibility enhances school attainment and significantly reduces
child labor. Similarly, Duflo (2003) finds a positive impact on child nutrition, typ-
ically defined by some measure of height-for-age and weight-for-height. Specifically,
she observes that girls living with pensioner-eligible females have substantial improve-
ments in nutritional indicators, but does not have observable effects on boys nor any
effect on a child’s health when males receive the pension. Both studies provide evi-
dence in support of intra-household resources transfer, and that control of household
6This could be because the majority of the elderly live in three-generation and skip-generation
households (Case and Deaton, 1998). As low as 7% of pensioners live without at least one 19-50-year
old and the fraction of children living with a pensioner has historically been high, especially among
households whose per capita incomes are in the lower percentile (Sagner and Mtati, 1999).
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resources plays a key role on how these resources are allocated.7
Other studies focus on household composition, resource allocation, decision
making, and remittances8 Ambler (2015) finds that women are more likely to be
primary decision-makers in their households when they become pension eligible. She
attributes this as evidence of a shift in bargaining power within the household due to
the increase in women’s personal income and the fraction of household income they
control. There are a host of studies on labor force participation of prime-aged adults
that reside with pensioners, but results are mixed. Bertrand et al. (2003) compares
households that have an age-eligible household member to those that do not and finds
a sharp decline in employment and labor supply responses by prime-age individuals
residing in households containing pension-eligible individuals. These effects are larger
when the pension is received by a woman rather than a man, but the labor supply
effects is significantly stronger for prime-age males in households with female pen-
sioners. The authors find larger effects on middle-aged men than younger men. They
attribute these results to bargaining power within the households, in which dominant
men with greater power in the household capture a larger share of the pension income
than when the pensioners is a female.
However, in more recent work, evidence suggests that the negative labor supply
response is strongly conditioned in how a household is defined. Posel et al. (2006)
show that the negative effect of pension receipt on prime-aged labor force participation
disappear when temporary migrant workers (absent household members) are consid-
ered in he definition of a household. In particular, they find that rural African/black
7Edmonds (2006) finds that pension benefits have a positive effect on children’s education attain-
ment and a significant reduction on child labor with a particularly strong effect when the pensioners
is male. He interprets these findings as evidence of liquidity constraint, and thus the need for social
assistance to overcome these constraints as well as in making human capital investments. In addi-
tion to providing proof of intra-household resources transfer, the results provide some convincing
evidence that control of the household resources matters and plays a key role on how productively
these recourses are reallocated.
8See (Ambler, 2015; Hamoudi and Thomas, 2014; Case and Deaton, 1998; Ranchhod, 2009).
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women are significantly more likely to be migrant workers when a member of their
household, especially a woman, is in receipt of a pension. Similarly, Ardington et al.
(2009) examines households before and after a gain/loss of the pension and find an
increase in employment among the prime-aged members when a household member
receives the pension. They attribute there findings to the notion that the pension
income received by women not only allows them to overcome credit constraints and
allows the prime-aged individuals to migrate in search of work, but also allows the
elderly to retire and provide childcare for female household members.
Studies of the effect of public pension eligibility on other developing countries
have similar findings. For example, de Carvalho Filho (2008) exploits a 1991 Brazilian
pension reform that reduced the minimum eligibility age for payment of benefits and
increased the minimum benefits. While the beneficiaries are not subject to an earning
test nor are required to retire, findings indicate a large negative response due to the
policy intervention. A larger effect is observed among rural men, where the pension
benefits decrease the probability of labor force participation by approximately 38
percent. Similarly, Kaushal (2014) examines the impact of India’s National Old-
Age Pension Scheme (NOAPS) on employment and well-being of the elderly poor
population, but finds a modest effect on elderly employment. She explains that this
modest result could partly be because the pension benefit under NOAPS is too small
to encourage large scale retirement in order to attain or maintain eligibility.
3.3 Basic Model: Predicted Effects
For simplicity, one can think of the impact on labor supply within the framework of
a static model, where an individual has well-behaved preferences over consumption
goods (C) and leisure (L) and maximizes his utility, U = u(L,C) subject to a budget
constraint. An individual earns a constant wage, W , in the labor market if he chooses
to work.
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Figure 3.1 shows how the introduction of a pension shifts the budget constraint
of an otherwise unpensioned individual. Consumption goods are on the vertical axis,
hours worked on the horizontal axis (moving left to right). Without OAP, the budget
constraint is ABJ with slope W and intercept B. AB is individual’s non-labor in-
come. With OAP, BC is the pension guarantee (i.e. the maximum amount given to
those with zero income or those under the exempted income level). In principle, be-
yond D, the pension amount is gradually adjusted to zero as earned income increases,
therefore creating the budget segment given byACDGJ . In practice, however, the
income test tends to apply in binary fashion, such that everyone who qualifies for the
pension tends to receive the maximum amount (Case and Deaton, 1998; Ranchhod,
2009; Ardington et al., 2009). This creates the budget set given by ACEGJ .9
Because individuals typically view the trade-off between consumption of com-
posite goods and leisure differently, indifference curves vary quite significantly, where
those who attach a high value to leisure tend to work less relative to those that do
not value leisure as highly. Thus, while we expect individuals to respond by reducing
labor supply or exiting the labor force upon pension age-eligibility, these considera-
tions suggest that the impact should vary by wage rate and interpersonal differences
in ”tastes for work”. In addition, the impact of pension on labor supply also depends
on which region of the budget constraint an individual was in before qualifying for
the pension.
All else equal, we would not expect labor force non-participants to re-enter
labor force once they become pensioned because they could have already done so
in the absence of the pension–their consumption opportunities increase by the OAP
amount BC and they relocate to C from B as in Figure 3.1. Those located on segment
BG have two types of responses: they either reduce hours or withdraw from the labor
9Yelowitz (1995) examines a similar “notch” when analyzing the effect of Medicaid on labor
supply and welfare participation among potential welfare participants in the United States.
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force; however the change in labor supply depends on their initial location on BG,
such that those closer to B are more likely to relocate to C (withdraw from labor
force) while those close to G are less likely to withdraw but rather are more likely to
reduce their hours.
Those located on segment GJ are not mechanically eligible. However, the notch
created by the discrete drop in pension benefits (from E to G), makes segment GH
non-favorable to a utility-maximizing individual, encouraging workers in segment GH
to engage in pension participation while reducing their labor supply. Those located
on segment HJ have sufficiently high earnings, and unlike those on GH, they are
less likely to respond to the pension benefits, though it is possible someone on this
segment would reduce hours enough to be eligible. Therefore, all else equal, we would
expect: those furthest “southeast” in the budget constraint around BF to drop out of
labor force; those furthest “northeast” near HJ to be unaffected and those between
to reduce hours of work.
The effects of OAP on labor supply also depends on the wage rate of the indi-
vidual. We illustrate this in Figure 3.2, where we graph consumption goods against
hours worked for high wage earners (individuals with a steeper wage line) and low
wage earners whose budget sets are given by ACEGJ and ACegj, respectively. AB
is non-labor income and BC is the pension ”guarantee” as defined above. As shown
in the figure, a high wage earner (low wage earner) continues to receive pension until
s/he reaches the income threshold, point E (e), where s/he loses the pension. In the
diagram, as drawn, it requires low wage earners to work up to h2′ before reaching
the income threshold, and subsequently losing the pension compared to h2 for high
wage earners (h2′ > h2). This indicates that, all else equal, high wage earners are
less likely to qualify for OAP benefits, and those that do qualify, are more likely to
reach the income threshold faster and as a result lose the pension. For high wage the
slope of the budget constraint line is more likely to be steeper than the indifference
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curve at the zero hours corner implying that LFP is more likely for higher wage.
3.4 Data
We use the GHS data. While this data provides a large sample size, particularly
important for the older demographic, one of its limitations is the lack of information
in the number of hours worked. As a consequence, we focus on examining labor force
participation. The sample consists of repeated cross-sections spanning 2006-2012 of
individuals aged 56 through 68, around the pension eligibility ages.
3.4.1 Predicted Wage
As mentioned above, due to lack of work hours in our data, we cannot control for
actual wages. However, we use the NIDS data, which consistently collect information
on weekly hours and earned monthly income, to predict wages used in this analysis.
Using the NIDS data we estimate:
lnwi,t =Z
′
i,tβ + i,t (3.1)
where wi,t is hourly wage (earned monthly income divided by monthly hours) for
individual i at year t; Zi,t is a vector of individual controls and i is an error term.
Using corresponding variables, we then use the coefficients obtained from equation
(3.1) to predict hourly wages in GHS. 10
3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
As noted above, the pension reform reduced men’s minimum age-eligibility from 65 to
63 in 2008, 63 to 61 in 2009, and finally from 61 to 60 in 2010 and beyond, while leaving
10 Right-hand side variables include, race, education, age, age squared, province, gender, and
marital status. Because identification of the predicted wage is an issue, we rely on predicted wage
being a quadratic in age but Labor force participation depending on age dummies.
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female’s minimum age-eligibility requirement unchanged. Therefore, we present the
summary statistics in Table 3.1 by age-groups. Overall, this is generally a poorly
educated subsample; men are relatively more educated at all age-groups, averaging
approximately 6 years of formal education versus 5 years for women. For both men
and women, labor force participation declines with age, although men are more likely
to participate in labor force at all ages.
Women are more likely to be widowed and to live alone than men. These
differences in marital status between men and women is consistent with women’s
longer life expectancy, age differences between spouses with women tending to marry
older men, as well as men’s greater likelihood of remarrying once widowed (Cohen
et al., 2006). The average household size is about 5 with a high likelihood of children,
suggesting that older individuals continue to live in large households as earlier noted
in Case and Deaton (1998).
3.4.3 Graphical Analysis
As a first step of our analysis, we plot some of the basic patterns in the data. In
Figures 3.3 and 3.4, we plot pension receipt by age for 2006-2009, the period before
the reform and the transition period, and for 2010-2012, the period after the reform.11
For men, Figure 3.3 shows that the proportion of those receiving pensions has a
substantial upward shift at the age of 60 and 65, as expected. The shifts in profile
corresponds to the change in their minimum pension age requirement. For women,
Figure 3.4 shows that the proportion of those receiving pension benefits follows a
similar pattern in both periods with a clear upwards shift at 60 years of age, the age
at which they attain the minimum age-eligibility requirement. Both figures imply a
11To identify grant recipients, the survey specifically asks ”Does [anyone] receive a [grant]?”Those
answering ”Yes” are prompted to specify grant type from which we can observe individuals who are
drawing old-age pension.
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substantial take up of the OAP upon eligibility.
While we observe that the fraction of the sample receiving pension benefits
increases from the eligibility age onwards and plateaus at approximately 90 percent
for females and 80 percent for males, there are some individuals who report receiving
pension benefits prior to the eligibility age. This is may be attributed to measurement
error and misreporting of age to the authorities (Ambler, 2015). Nonetheless, the
discontinuity at eligibility age is unmistakably clear for all years.
To provide some evidence on the effect of age-eligibility on labor force partici-
pation, we plot the fraction of individuals that report to be receiving the pension in
panel A and those in the labor force in different time periods, by age in panel B of
Figures 3.5 and 3.6. Note, however, that panel A in both figures is basically a repeat
of Figures 3.3 and 3.4 but with “before” and “after” collapsed into one graph each. We
use the same split for labor force participation in Panel B. In line with our hypothesis
that eligibility generates an exogenous incentive to reduce work effort, the disconti-
nuity in the labor force participation observed at the eligibility ages strongly suggests
a correlation between age-eligibility and labor force withdrawal. Males’ labor force
participation rates are significantly higher than that of females. Their LFP follows a
downward decline, but with a significant spike downwards at the eligibility age. For
instance, we observe that the LFP declines steadily before age 59, but then drops
by approximately 14 points (from about 52 to 38 percent) between ages 59 and 60,
post reform. Thereafter it declines steadily until it reaches around 12 percent. For
women aged 55-59, the labor force participation rates declines steadily from around
40 to 30 percent, then dropping by over 10 percentage points at the eligibility age,
and thereafter it declines steadily until it reaches around 10 percent.
Importantly, we observe a substantial drop in labor force participation at the
minimum eligibility age. Figures 3.5 (Panel B), estimates this drop in labor force
participation as approximately 10 percentage points for males aged 59-60 after the
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pension reform and for 64-65 before the pension reform. The effect on women is of
approximately the same magnitude for 59-60 in both periods, as shown in Figures 3.6
(Panel B). We, however, note that these effects are not as big as the increase in the
take up of the OAP. This is likely due to the fact that many in this age group were
out of the LFP prior to OAP eligibility because of, for example, receipt of a disability
grant. Once these individuals reach 60 years they are eligible for the OAP, and since
they do not work they are reflected in the OAP receipt (Panel A) but not on the
drop in labor force participation (Panel B). One can also think of a situation wherein
individuals did not previously participate in the labor force, but were not pension age
eligible as well. Upon reaching the eligibility age and participating in pension, they
are likely to impact the pension trend, but not the a labor force participation trend.
Also, another possible explanation is that some individuals who take up the OAP
may only reduce their work hours when they start receiving the pension instead of
dropping from the labor force entirely. As such they would only be reflected in Panel
A, but not in Panel B.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
3.5.1 Basic Estimation strategy
Because the reform directly affects only men of a specific age and not others, the
impact of the reform on labor force participation can be identified by comparing
changes in the labor force participation of the affected men (i.e., men aged 60-64 years
who become pension age-eligible as a result of the lowered age-eligibility requirement)
with those not “directly” affected by the the reform (i.e., those aged 56-59 & 65-
68 years), over time relative to when the reform was introduced. If subscripts T ,
C, PRE, and POST denote the treated age-group, the control age-group, before,
and after the reform respectively, then equation 3.2 gives the change in labor force
27
participation by treatment group.12
∆LFPT = LFPT,Post − LFPT,Pre
∆LFPC = LFPC,Post − LFPC,Pre
(3.2)
The difference between the two then gives us the estimated impact of pension age-
eligibility on labor force participation. This is basic the difference-in-difference (DD)
approach.
DD =∆LFPT −∆LFPC . (3.3)
We recognize that there may be some underlying trends in labor force participation
or economic shocks common to all workers, including women, that affect labor market
outcomes. We therefore address this by then subtracting from the above DD a simi-
lar statistic for women, thus obtaining a difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD)
estimator. The idea is to use the trend for the women’s labor force participation as a
counterfactual to the reform for men, and therefore difference away any relative trend
between the two that has nothing to do with the policy or are due to country-specific
changes in economy that affect everyone’s labor force participation. While we use the
same notation (T , C) for the women, we emphasize that their “age-eligibility”, unlike
the men’s, does not change.
DDD =DDMale −DDFemale = ∆LFPMale −∆LFPFemale (3.4)
An alternative approach would be to use pension receipt itself as driving labor supply
changes. Unfortunately pension take-up conditional on age-eligibility is endogenous,
but the eligibility age is not because it is imposed by the government and there-
fore exogenous to individual outcomes. For this reason, we eliminate this bias and
12 For expositional ease we estimate this using a restricted subsample that excludes 2009. Re-
stricting the pre-reform period to 2006-2008 and the post-reform period to 2010-2012 seems more
appropriate in order to have a clear-cut before and after period.
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the problem of unobserved heterogeneity by using age-eligibility rather than actual
pension receipt. The age-eligibility variable is closely correlated with actual pension
receipt and we recognize that our coefficient of interest yields the intention-to-treat
(ITT) effect which we expect to be smaller than the average treatment effect (ATE)
because primarily not all age-eligible individuals choose/are granted access to the
pension.
Given that individuals closer to the age eligibility threshold are more likely
to behave differently from those further away and therefore confound our results, it
seems reasonable to focus the analysis on a close range of age-groups. We therefore
start by comparing the estimates of the just-made-eligible (treated group between
60 and 61) with the soon-to-be-eligible (untreated group between 58 and 59 years).
Table 3.2 presents our results from the labor force participation means. In each
panel, the second column contains mean labor force participation rates before the
reform; the third column contains rates after the reform; and the forth contains the
difference between the two periods. The difference-in-difference estimates of labor
force participation is in bold. Panel A compares the change in labor force participation
for males. There was a 11.5 percentage points (from 46.7 percent to 35.2 percent)
fall in labor force participation rate for the 60-61 year olds (treated age group) over
the two periods, compared to a 1.3 percentage points (from 58.6 percent to 59.9
percent) increase for the 58-59 year olds (untreated age group). This corresponds to
a (statistically significant) 12.8 percentage points (-11.5 percentage points to +1.3
percentage points) relative fall in labor force participation of 60-61 year olds after the
the reform. This is the difference-in-difference estimate of the reform.
However, if there was a common labor market shock to both genders over this
period, these estimates will not identify the effect of the law. We examine this in
panel B by performing the same exercise for females. We find a fall in labor force
participation for the 60-61 year olds, relative to the 58-59 year olds of 1.7 percentage
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points, though not statistically significant. Taken together, these figures imply a
DDD estimate (difference between panel A and B) of 11.1 percentage points fall in
labor force participation due to age-eligibility.
As part of sensitivity analysis, we further analyze how the labor force participa-
tion means of 63-64 year olds (these are also among the just-made-eligible) compare
with those that are not directly “affected” by the reform (individuals between 65 and
66 years, who would have been age-eligible regardless of the reform). Results are
illustrated in Table 3.3. The estimates show a statistically significant 6.4 percentage
points decrease in labor force participation for the 63-64 year old males relative to
their 65-66 year old males, before and after the reform. The same statistics for the
women was only 2.3 percentage points (not significant). Therefore, the difference-in-
difference-in-difference estimates show a statistically significant 8.7 percentage points
fall in labor force participation, a little smaller in magnitude relative to the estimates
in Table 3.2 for the younger group. So far, the evidence from the DD and DDD
estimates provides some preliminary evidence supporting the hypothesis that labor
force participation responds to pension age-eligibility. Below we formalize these in a
regression framework.
3.5.2 Statistical Model
Because the groups differ in demographic characteristics and the observed results may
reflect the underlying differences, we extend this framework in a regression setting
in the remainder of this section to account for these variations. In addition, these
demographic controls help to produce more efficient estimates.
We first estimate a DD model of the form:
Yi,t = X
′
i,tβ1 + αELIG(Age, Y ear)i,t + β2AGEi,t + β3Y EARt + i,t (3.5)
where i and t represents individual and year, respectively, and Yi,t is an indicator
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variable that is equal to 1 if individual i at year t is in the labor force. The vector
Xi is a set of individual and household controls which includes education, predicted
wage, race, marital status, health status, urban residence, household size, number
of children, province of residence, and material used for the walls and roof (as a
proxy for social economic status); ELIGi,t equals 1 if an individual is pension age-
eligible, otherwise zero; AGEi,t are age dummies to capture age trends while Y EARi,t
are year dummies and controls for secular trend. See Table 3.4 for the description
of the variables used in the regression. The coefficient α identifies the impact of
attaining pension age-eligibility on individual i at time t: we expect it to be negative
if pension age-eligibility decreases the likelihood of labor force participation, even
after controlling for the other observable characteristics.
We introduce a hypothetical age-eligibility variable for women and extend equa-
tion 3.5 to a difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) specification by including
women. This model specification is given by:
Yi,t =X
′
i,tβ1 + α1[ELIGi,t ∗MALEi] + α2ELIGi,t+
+ α3[Y EARt ∗MALEi] + α4[AGEi,t ∗MALEi]+
+ α5MALEi + β2AGEi,t + β3Y EARt + i,t
(3.6)
where the variable MALEi equals to 1 for males, otherwise zero. The key variable
of interest is the ELIGi,t x MALEi interaction which captures DDD estimate of the
effect on LFP.
The identifying assumptions that we make are (1) there are no contemporaneous
shocks to the relative labor force participation of the treated and control groups
during the reform period, other than the change in pension eligibility age for men.
But, while we note that the existence of other factors during the period is possible,
there is no reason to think that they would have the observed effects exactly at the
gender-specific pension-age threshold; and (2) in the absence of the pension reform,
changes in labor force participation of the treated age group and control age group
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would have been the same, conditional on observables–‘common trends’ assumption.
3.6 Empirical Results
3.6.1 Main Results
Table 3.5 presents the marginal effects from the logit estimation of the DD estimator
in equation 3.5. In column (1), the estimation includes only age and year dummies,
and not any other individual or household level controls. As discussed previously, the
impact of OAP should get smaller as the wages rises. To assess this we include Age-
eligbility x Predicted wage interaction along with the individual controls in Column
(2); and in column (3), we further add household controls as noted in the the previous
section. Column (1) shows that pension age-eligibility decreases the probability of
labor force participation by 10.97 percentage points, which is significant at 1 percent.
Additional controls in Columns (2) and (3) do not change the estimate by much;
the coefficient on age-eligibility is estimated at -10.38 and -10.39 percentage points,
respectively. These coefficients remain statistically significant at 1 percent.13 Im-
portantly, as predicted in section (4), our results indicate that the observed negative
effect of pension age-eligibility decreases with wage, such that, pension age-eligibility
is less likely to discourage high wage workers from the labor force.
Table 3.6 reports the difference-in-difference-in-difference estimates from equa-
tion 3.6 above. In column (1), we observe that the coefficient on age-eligibility is
significantly negative, and the coefficient on male is positively significant. The inter-
action, Age-eligbility x Male, which captures the impact of pension age-eligibility for
men relative to women, is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Our results show that pension age-eligibility, on average, reduces the probability of
13The median predicted wage for the age group in this analysis is (R10) per hour while the mean
is R17 per hour.
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labor force participation in men by 7.02 percentage points. Columns (2) and (3) adds
control for individual, household, predicted wage, and age-eligbility x predicted wage
interaction. Focusing on Column (3), we observe that the sum of age-eligibility x
male and age-eligibility x predicted wage x male, which captures the difference-in-
difference-in-difference impact of pension age-eligibility controlling for predicted wage
is 6.14 when computed at the median predicted wage.
3.7 Caveats
A property of the above regression specification (equation 3.5) is that it imposes
restrictions that pension age-eligibility has the same effect in each age and year. We
relax this assumption by allowing the effects to vary by age and year. Overall, this
findings support our basic results.
One concern with our identification is that whereas the system is universal,
take-up rate is not completely conditional on age-eligibility; some do not qualify by
virtue of having significantly high income, and we suspect that others may select not
to participate regardless of their qualification. We also note that the fraction of those
that report as receiving the pension increases with age even beyond the eligibility age,
which may suggest that either some individuals choose not to participate right away
or they simply qualify later on. Lastly, while age discontinuity in pension receipt is
unmistakable, we observe that some age-ineligible individuals find ways to receive the
pension.
One would also be concerned with the possibility of “age-heaping”: rounding up
ages to end in 5 or 0 and thus creating a problem with our identification strategy,
which relies on age for identification. We plot the age profiles for men and women,
and while the distribution is not smooth, we do not find evidence to support the idea
that this may be an issue.
We also note that our inference relies on the assumption that there is no po-
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tential for anticipatory effect of individuals close to the pension-eligibility age. If this
group is able to smooth consumption by borrowing against potential future income
or consuming current assets, then labor supply effect may be potentially underes-
timated because individuals may reduce their labor supply in anticipation of their
future pension benefits. However, if the individuals are credit-constrained or dis-
count their future pension benefits heavily, we would expect to observe changes in
their labor supply only upon actual receipt of the benefits. In the context of South
Africa, Edmonds (2006) points out that the majority of the older population is credit-
constrained; therefore we expect the impact of consumption smoothing in this paper
to be limited.14 However, to the extent that consumption smoothing occurs, our
estimates will be biased downwards.
3.8 Conclusion
The reform in South Africa’s Old-Age Pension system in 2008 provides a unique
opportunity to identify the effect of a non-contributory old age pension on labor force
participation. In particular, the South African OAP reforms reduced, in steps, the
minimum pension eligibility age for men from 65 to 60. The modification provided
us with a natural experiment and an opportunity to evaluate potential effects of such
a large cash transfer on the basis of a policy intervention rather than relying on
cross-individual variation in eligibility/pension receipt, which is likely to be biased
by unobserved characteristics. We use a difference-in-difference and difference-in-
difference-in-difference specification to exploit this reform.
We observe that pension eligibility is conditional almost exclusively on age, with
the fraction of men and women that report to be receiving the pension increasing dra-
matically at the eligibility age. While pension eligibility does not stipulate that the
14Lund (1993) finds no descriptive evidence of individuals borrowing in advance of their eligibility
status.
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recipients should not work, we also find that age-eligibility appears to have a strong
negative impact on labor force participation. Using the median predicted wage, our
preferred DDD estimator estimates an approximately 6.14 percentage points fall in
labor force participation among the pension-eligible male. We observe that the OAP
creates incentives for workers to withdraw from the labor force and that the pension
reform made it even easier for younger working males to withdraw from labor force.
Thus, while poverty reduction is the primary objective, and while similar pension pro-
grams may be attractive to poor countries who face similar social problems, countries
should take into account its impact on labor force participation.
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3.9 Figures
Figure 3.1: Stylized Budget Constraint
Note: Hours of work increase as you move left to right (A to T)
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Figure 3.2: Stylized Budget Constraint: Low Versus High Wage
Note: Hours of work increase as you move left to right (A to T)
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Figure 3.3: Males’ Pension Receipt by Age in 2006-2012
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These panels present changes in the fraction of males that report to be on OAP by
age. The top panel presents the change before the policy reform (2006-2008) and
the transition year (2009). The bottom panel presents the change after the reform
(2010-2012). Figures are compiled using the 2006-2012 GHS data.
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Figure 3.4: Females’ Pension Receipt by Age in 2006-2012
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These panels present changes in the fraction of females that report to be on OAP
by age. The top panel presents the change before the policy reform (2006-2008) and
the transition year (2009). The bottom panel presents the change after the reform
(2010-2012). Figures are compiled using the 2006-2012 GHS data.
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Figure 3.5: Males’ Pension Receipt & Labor Force Participation by Age
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Notes: These panels present change in the fraction of males who report to be on pension
(Panel A) and labor force participation (panel B) by age, before and after the pension reform.
We collapse years before the reform into one graph and years after the reform into another
graph. The transition year is omitted. Figures compiled using the 2006-2012 GHS data.
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Figure 3.6: Females’ Pension Receipt & Labor Force Participation
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Notes: These panels present change in the fraction of females who report to be on pension
(Panel A) and labor force participation (panel B) by age, before and after the pension reform.
We collapse years before the reform into one graph and years after the reform into another
graph. The transition year is omitted. Figures compiled using the 2006-2012 GHS data.
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3.10 Tables
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Males Females
Variable 56-59 60-64 65-68 56-59 60-64 65-68
Labor Force Participation 0.64 0.36 0.14 0.40 0.15 0.05
Single (never married) 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.19 0.15 0.13
Married 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.44 0.41 0.34
Divorced/widowed 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.37 0.44 0.53
African/black 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.73 0.72 0.73
Coloured 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.11
Asian/Indian 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02
White 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.10 0.12 0.13
Urban 0.48 0.46 0.43 0.44 0.41 0.38
Education 6.67 6.22 5.72 5.99 5.46 4.84
Household size 4.63 4.55 4.45 4.67 4.55 4.45
No. of children 1.42 1.39 1.35 1.58 1.58 1.58
N 7442 7300 4788 9976 10840 6922
Notes: This table summarizes characteristics of the individuals aged 56-68. Data are from
survey years 2006-2012 of the General Household Survey (GHS).
Copyright c© Steve M. M. Muchiri, 2016.
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Table 3.2: DD and DDD Estimates: Labor Force Participation (Age 58-61)
Before Reform After Reform Time
(2006-2008 ) (2010-2012) Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Males
Ages 60-61 0.467 0.352 -0.115
(0.014) (0.010) (0.017)
[1173] [1211]
Ages 58-59 0.586 0.599 0.013
(0.016) (0.017) (0.023)
[1381] [1317]
Difference at -0.119 -0.247
a point in time (0.021) (0.020)
DD -0.128
(0.029)
Panel B: Females
Ages 60-61 0.162 0.200 0.038
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
[1916] [1970]
Ages 58-59 0.317 0.372 0.055
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011)
[1950] [1921]
Difference at -0.155 0.172
a point in time (0.008) (0.010)
DD -0.017
(0.013)
DDD -0.111
(0.032)
Notes: Data are form Survey years 2006-2008 and 2010-2012 of GHS. We exclude
year 2009, the transition period, in order to have a clear before and after estimation.
The sample contains men and women between the ages of 58 and 61. Cells contain
mean labor force participation rates for men in Panel (A) and women in Panel (B)
by age groups as identified on the left axis. Standard errors are given in parenthe-
sis while sample sizes are given in square brackets. Column (1) presents mean labor
force participation before the policy reform and column (2) after the policy reform.
Difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) is the difference-in-difference in panel (A)
minus that in panel (B).
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Table 3.3: DD and DDD Estimates: Labor Force Participation (Age 63-66)
Before Reform After Reform Time
(2006-2008) (2010-2012) Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Males
Ages 63-64 0.352 0.272 -0.080
(0.011) (0.008) (0.014)
[1088] [1086]
Ages 65-66 0.167 0.151 -0.016
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
[1141] [960]
Difference at a 0.185 0.121
point in time (0.012) (0.009)
DD -0.064
(0.016)
Panel B: Females
Ages 63-64 0.095 0.116 0.021
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
[1625] [1607]
Ages 65-66 0.062 0.060 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
[1681] [1368]
Difference at a 0.033 0.056
point in time (0.003) (0.004)
DD 0.023
(0.005)
DDD -0.087
(0.017)
Notes: Data are form Survey years 2006-2008 and 2010-2012 of GHS. We exclude
year 2009, the transition period, in order to have a clear before and after estimation.
The sample contains men and women between the ages of 63 and 66. Cells contain
mean labor force participation rates for men in Panel (A) and women in Panel (B)
by age groups as identified on the left axis. Standard errors are given in parenthe-
sis while sample sizes are given in square brackets. Column (1) presents mean labor
force participation before the policy reform and column (2) after the policy reform.
Difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) is the difference-in-difference in panel (A)
minus that in panel (B).
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Table 3.4: Variables Used in Regressions
Variable Definition
Age-eligibility Age-eligibility is defined by age and year. For male it is
equals to 1 if: (i) at least 65 years in 2006-2008, (ii) at
least 61 years old in 2009, or (iii) at least 60 years old in
2010-2012, otherwise zero. For female, the hypothetical age
eligibility follows the same conditions in the analysis, how-
ever, in practice it is set at 60 and does not change.
Education Dummy variables for each level of formal education attain-
ment.
Racial classifications Dummy variables for race as defined in the General House-
hold Survey (GHS): African/black, white, Indian/Asian and
coloured. White is the omitted.
Marital status Dummy variables for singles (never married), married, di-
vorced/widow. Married is the omitted.
Urban residence Dummy variables for urban or rural residents. Rural is the
omitted.
Number of children Residents that are under 18 years.
Province of residence Dummy variables for all the 9 provinces.
Year Dummy variable for year of survey (2006-2012).
Age Dummy variables for each year (56-68 years).
Walls and roofs Dummy variables for the material used for the roofs and
walls: bricks or cement, corrugated iron/zinc, mixture of
mud and cement, wood or plastic or cardboard, thatching
or wattle and daub, and asbestos.
Predicted wage Estimated using NIDS data.
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Table 3.5: Estimated DD Effects of Pension Age-Eligibility on Labor Force
Participation
Specification: (1) (2) (3)
Age Eligibility -0.1097∗∗∗ -0.1038∗∗∗ -0.1039∗∗∗
(0.0164) (0.0203) (0.0203)
Predicted Wage 0.0012∗ 0.0012∗
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Age Eligibility x Predicted Wage 0.0002 0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Spouse (Age Eligibility) -0.1338∗∗∗ -0.1383∗∗∗
(0.0226) (0.0228)
Spouse(Predicted Wage) 0.0013∗∗ 0.0010
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Spouse (Age Eligibility x Predicted Wage) 0.0008 0.0009
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Education (Yrs) 0.0110∗∗∗ 0.0105∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0017)
Urban 0.0453∗∗∗ 0.0408∗∗∗
(0.0113) (0.0113)
Household Size -0.0087∗∗
(0.0037)
No. of Children -0.0034
(0.0058)
N 17,141 17,141 17,141
Individual characteristics No Yes Yes
Household characteristics No No Yes
Notes: Logit regressions; marginal effects reported; standard errors in parentheses. Sample
is restricted to individuals aged 56-68. Each specification includes controls for province,
age and year dummies. Column 1 presents results with controls for only age and year
and province dummies, and not any individual nor household level controls; in column (2)
we add individuals controls including the predicted wage and the interaction of predicted
wage and eligibility; and finally in column (3) we add household controls. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗
p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table 3.6: Estimated DDD Effects of Pension Age-Eligibility on Labor Force
Participation
Specification: (1) (2) (3)
Age Eligibility x Male -0.0692∗∗∗ -0.0591∗∗∗ -0.0530∗∗
(0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0213)
Age Eligibility -0.0154 -0.0114 -0.0240
(0.0131) (0.0129) (0.0157)
0b.Male 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(.) (.) (.)
1.Male 0.2475∗∗∗ 0.1946∗∗∗ 0.2059∗∗∗
(0.0106) (0.0113) (0.0143)
Predicted Wage 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0005)
Education (Yrs) 0.0120∗∗∗ 0.0110∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0010)
Spouse (Age Eligibility) -0.0960∗∗∗ -0.0844∗∗∗
(0.0079) (0.0164)
Spouse (Predicted Wage) -0.0001 0.0018∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0004)
Urban 0.0319∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗
(0.0061) (0.0061)
Age Eligbility x Predicted Wage 0.0003
(0.0004)
Predicted Wage x Male -0.0031∗∗∗
(0.0005)
Age Eligibility x Predicted Wage x Male -0.0001
(0.0005)
Spouse (Age Eligibility x Predicted Wage) 0.0000
(0.0005)
Spouse (Age Eligibility x Predicted Wage x Male) 0.0017∗∗∗
(0.0006)
Spouse (Predicted Wage x Male) -0.0039∗∗∗
(0.0005)
Spouse (Age Eligibility x Male) -0.0488∗∗
(0.0198)
N 42,947 42,936 42,936
Individual characteristics No Yes Yes
Household characteristics No No Yes
Notes: Logit regressions; marginal effects reported; standard errors in parentheses. Sample
is restricted to individuals aged 56-68. Each specification includes controls for age and
year dummies. Column 1 presents results with controls for only age and year and province
dummies, and not any individual nor household level controls; in column (2) we add
individuals controls with the exception of predicted wage and the interaction of predicted
wage and eligibility; in column (3), we further add predicted wage and the interaction of
predicted wage and eligibility: and finally in column (4) we add household controls. ∗∗∗
p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Chapter 4 Social Cash Transfers and Measures of Well-being: A Look at
the South African Old Age Pension Program
4.1 Introduction
The concept of social safety nets, especially cash transfer programs, has increasingly
gained popularity in developing countries as an important policy for social protection
(Fiszbein et al., 2009; Grosh et al., 2008). For example, in the last decade, in particu-
lar, this increase has been rapid in Sub-Saharan Africa (Garcia et al., 2012).1 A host
of countries such as Mexico, Nicaragua, Brazil, Turkey and Honduras have also in
recent years implemented cash transfer programs such as Conditional Cash Transfers
(CCTs) under the support of the World Bank and other international financial in-
stitutions. Studies show that, among others, Mexico’s Progresa (now Oportunidas)
and Brazil’s Bolsa Familia have gained extremely popular support in improving
school enrollment and retention, and health outcomes for the poor. Evidence from
a wide range of studies across countries also find that cash transfers are effective in
alleviating cases of chronic poverty (Barrientos, 2006; Farrington and Slater, 2006),
helping households to diversify their livelihoods, better manage risk, and protect
against shocks (Macours et al., 2012).
South Africa has for many years had a large-scale cash transfer program. This
program forms the basis of the country’s social assistance program which includes
Disability Grant (DG), Childcare Grant (CG), and Old Age Program (OAP). OAP
is a non-contributory pension program, and while it is targeted to poor elderly South
1 Social protection is defined as measures aimed at providing income or consumption transfers
to the poor with the intent of enhancing their social status (addressing issues of vulnerability and
poverty) (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2007). Among those requiring social protection are the
chronic poor, including the elderly and orphans; those who are economically at risk, such as those
living with HIV/AIDS; and people living with disability. Given the dissimilarity in their needs, often
times they are administered by different agencies: for instance, social transfer (e.g., disability grant,
childcare grant, or Old Age Pension (OAP) in the case of South Africa), and social services (e.g.,
home-based care, health-care, or education).
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Africans, studies find that it enhances school attainment and significantly reduces
child labor (Edmonds, 2006), improves children’s nutrition (Duflo, 2003), as well as
generates positive well-being outcomes, including improved health status (Case, 2004;
Schatz et al., 2012).
In developing countries, the relevance of cash transfers is highlighted by the
fact that they are predictable and provide recipients with the flexibility to plan their
expenditures, meet basic consumption needs, and invest in productive activities, such
as agriculture, which in turn has potential to improve their well-being.2 The impact of
these transfers is shown to start with the recipients, then extends to other household
members; however, some studies also point out that the impact eventually extended
to the community. This observation is based on the idea that it is in small businesses
and farms located in their communities that these incomes are spent (Ardington and
Lund, 1995; Lund, 1993; Møller and Sotshongaye, 1996; Davies and Davey, 2008).
However, some studies also link some of these cash transfers to negative impacts,
such as distortion on labor supply. For instance in Mexico, Juarez (2009) finds that
implementation of a non-contributory cash transfer program for residents aged 70
and older, reduces the labor supply of prime-aged men and women who reside with a
beneficiary. For South Africa, previous studies on the impact of OAP find that labor
force participation rates fall sharply at the eligibility age (Lam et al., 2006; Ranchhod,
2009). Others find that OAP, while targeted to the poor elderly, also affects labor
force participation (Bertrand et al., 2003) and hours worked (Edmonds, 2006) of their
co-residents.3
The growing importance of cash transfers as an anti-poverty instrument high-
2Social transfers are either conditional or unconditional (Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) or
Unconditional Cash Transfers (UCT)) and can take various forms, such as cash or vouchers.
3The effect of OAP on the labor supply of co-residents is mixed. In more recent work, Posel et al.
(2006) and Ardington et al. (2009) find an increase in employment among the prime-aged members
when a household members receives the OAP and attribute the difference on how a household is
defined.
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lights the importance of understanding how it improves the well-being of beneficiaries.
We explore this question by examining the impact of the Old Age Pension on some
selected household items. Specifically, we consider a wide range of outcomes includ-
ing food security, housing quality (access to water and toilet facilities), and durable
goods (ownership of televisions, radios, and phones). Because the majority of South
Africans live in low-income settings, we expect that, in theory, their marginal propen-
sity to consume additional income will be quite high and therefore the cash transfer
is expected to have a positive effect.
This paper is structured as follows: the next section briefly describes South
Africa’s household structure. Section 3 describes the conceptual framework, and
section 4 describes the data, and presents the empirical approach. The impact of
OAP on food security and other household outcomes are analyzed in sections 5 and
6, respectively. The last section concludes.
4.2 Household Structure
As noted in Case and Deaton (1998) and Ardington et al. (2007), one dimension of
South African society that is significant in our analysis, for instance, the analysis on
children’s food security, is the complex household structure wherein families tend to
live in extended family arrangements, such as multi-generation and skip-generation
households.4 Traditionally in South Africa, social protection for older people is pro-
vided by both formal and informal programs that have been developed to reduce
poverty and vulnerability in old age. However, household structure, especially among
black South African households, was historically relied upon for provision of care and
food for older people. Lam et al. (2006), however, points out that household structure
4Multi-generation and skip-generation household concepts are generally applied to households
made up of co-resident grandparents and grandchildren or at least two adult generations (for exam-
ple, parents and adult children where either adult can be the head of household).
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has taken on new importance due to high cases of HIV/AIDS and high unemployment
rates that have weakened prime-aged adults’ ability to support their families. This
in turn has reversed the role so that the elderly now support the younger generation.
It is estimated that more than 50% of elderly adults live with at least one
younger woman, and a lower fraction, but still significant, live with at least one
younger man. Likewise, a large fraction of the elderly live with children, but this
is more common in women than in men. For example, (Case and Menendez, 2007;
Ambler, 2015) observe that approximately 40% and 11% of children under 5 years live
with women and men above 50 years old, respectively.5 Therefore, to some extent,
the benefits are effectively a contribution to the overall household income in that
the income reaches other household members such as children as well as working-
age adults (Case and Deaton, 1998; Duflo, 2000, 2003; Edmonds, 2006). In poor
households, pension constitutes the largest fraction of the income which as a result
makes the OAP a key element in the social safety net not only for the targeted
group, but also for the household as a whole (Barrientos, 2005). Additionally, while
standard literature on the old age pension emphasizes that it provides the elderly
with independence, in the case of South Africa, the presence of other residents who
depend on the pension implies that an unusual burden is placed on the elderly.
4.3 Conceptual Framework
In this section, we present a simple model to illustrate how cash transfers relax con-
straints, such as savings and credit constraints, and as a result generate productive
and consumptive impacts for households with low levels of household assets. The
model draws extensively on poverty trap literature that attempts to explain why
some households are trapped at very low levels of assets and income, following Bar-
5Older people live alone in only 6.8 percent of South African households and reside with children
in 64.2 percent of the households. South Africa’s mean household size is 5.5. (Barrientos, 2005).
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rett et al. (2008) and Carter and Barrett (2006). We consider a production function
with two technologies, a low-return and a high-return technology that requires an
initial fixed cost:
f(αi, kit) =

fL(αi, kit) = αik
γL
it
fH(αi, kit) = αit(kit − k¯)γH
(4.1)
where 0 < γL < γH < 1. f(.) denotes expected income (thus consumption or living
standard), individual i is endowed with ability αi and kit assets at time t. In the case
of our analysis, αi can represent household’s characteristics, such as individual skills,
social capital (social network and cooperation) which may increase returns. L denotes
“low-return” technology while H “high-return” technology subject to a fixed cost, k¯.
We can assume low-return technology to be, for instance, low-return crops and high-
return technology would be high-return crops, or livestocks, or other ventures that
require higher fixed costs.6 Both technologies are capital-using and skill-sensitive,
such that in both cases, more-skilled people can produce more (consume more) than
less-skilled. Depending on accessible technology, an individual has a steady-state
investment value: k∗L(αi) for the low technology and k
∗
H(αi) for the high technology.
Those investing in low technology remain trapped in the low steady state and remain
in a poor standard of living while those investing in the high technology reach the
high steady state level and consequently reach a non-poor standard of living.7
6 Presence of initial fixed cost implies that high-return technology is not worth being applied at
low amounts of capital.
7 There exists a threshold level k̂(αi) such that kL(αi) = kH(αi) above which the use of high
technology leads to higher production. Nonetheless, if one’s initial assets are such that k∗L(αi)< ki0
< k̂(αi), it is unclear whether an individual with the initial capital below ki0 will move towards
the high- or low-return technology and, therefore, towards the non-poor or poor standard of living
associated with it. On one hand, because the individual is above the low-return steady state,
additional return to investments are relatively lower and thus discouraging. Will this individual
then gravitate towards the low-return steady state and poor standard of living? On the other hand,
one might ask whether the individuals will accumulate assets over time, and eventually end up at
the high-return steady state and non-poor standard of living?
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The problem can be analyzed by use of a dynamic choice model where each
period an individual makes consumption and investment decisions to maximize a
lifetime utility given by:
maxEτ
∞∑
t=τ
βt−1µ(cit) (4.2)
such that
cit + iit ≤ fj(αi, kit), j {L,H} (4.3)
kit+1 = θt[iit + (1− δ)kit]
kiτ is given
cit and iit are consumption and investment at time t, such that in every period, house-
holds allocate the income they earn between consumption and investments (Equation
4.3). β is the discount factor for future consumption, while θt [0,1] is a random
variable. We introduce negative shocks, θt<1.
8 δ is the assets’ depreciation rate. The
cumulative density function of θt is denoted as Ω(.), thus in the presence of negative
investment shocks, the investment rule is given by i∗(kit|α,Ω), where i∗ is the policy
function associated with the Bellman equation below.
V (kit) ≡ maxit, j {u (fj(α, kit)− iit) + βE[V (kit+1|kit, iit)]} , j {L,H} (4.4)
where
E[V (kit+1|kit, iit)] =
∫
V (θt[iit + (1− δ)kit])dΩ(θt) (4.5)
On one end, individuals with low initial value of assets, ki0, will invest or dis-
invest and consequently converge at k∗L(αi). On the other hand, those with a higher
initial level of assets or equal to k̂(αi) will converge at a higher steady state, k
∗
H(αi).
For those with low initial assets, such that kL(αi)< ki0 < k̂(αi), there is a critical
8θt=1 would indicate no shocks and θt>1 in principle would indicate positive shock; however,
in our case we do not consider the latter. This model also assumes no borrowing, consistent with
Edmonds (2006).
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threshold level, k˜(αi), above which they choose to make additional investments to
reach k̂(αi) and consequently switch to the high-return technology (Buera, 2006).
9
Cash transfer, in this framework, can be seen as a component of assets. When
these transfers are low, or when households are facing extreme budget constraints,
all the cash is consumed, and a unit increase in cash is more likely to lead to a unit
increase in consumption; all the cash would be used immediately for consumption
purposes, especially for food, in our case. However, when these transfers are large
enough or households are not severely constrained, instead of consuming it all, house-
holds may save part of it for investment in areas like livestock production or in food
production which leads to a sustainable increase in food consumption in the long run.
For example in the case of Progresa in Mexico Gertler et al. (2012) and under the
Malawi Social Cash Transfer (SCT) scheme Covarrubias et al. (2012) where benefi-
ciary households invest some of the benefits in agricultural assets and livestock thus
improving their household’s long-term living standards. Therefore in extreme budget
constraints, cash transfers would probably not foster much consumption of durable
household goods, such as bicycles, televisions, or productive investments for house-
holds at the very bottom of the wealth distribution, but may help those very close to
the relatively wealthier households to cross over the assets threshold, thus increasing
consumption in areas that readily and directly impact their livelihoods. Nonetheless,
we should observe a positive impact in areas such as food consumption.
Taking that into account, it makes it important to understand the decision-
making process of a household. There is a considerably large volume of empirical
studies on household decision-making, which can be classified into 2 broad categories:
the unitary model and the non-unitary model (e.g., collective models).
9Buera (2006)refers k˜(αi) as the Micawber threshold/frontier, below which individuals are under
a poverty trap.
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4.3.1 Unitary Models
Unitary models treat households as a unit and while the underlying assumption of
their various models differ, they generally assume that income within the household
is spent in the same way regardless of the identity of the family member who earns or
controls it (Becker, 1974; Samuelson, 1956). The simplicity of the model is quite ap-
pealing; however, over the years, the unitary model has received theoretical critiques
arguing that it contradicts individual rationality in which individuals have heteroge-
neous preferences (Chiappori, 1992). From the empirical point of view, several studies
have rejected the notion of income pooling and have provided evidence that the iden-
tity of the income earner influences how income is eventually spent (Schultz, 1990).
For instance, Lundberg et al. (1997) analyze a United Kingdom policy change in the
late 1970s that changed the mode of allocation of child benefits from the fathers to
a direct payment to mothers. Following this change, they observed an increase in
consumption for women’s and children’s goods relative to the men’s, a divergence
from the unitary model. Similarly, in a study that is more relevant to our analysis,
Duflo (2003) analyzes the impact of OAP in South Africa on children’s nutritional
status and finds that income in the hands of females leads to significant improvement
in children’s nutrition and health relative to that in the hands of males.
Previous criticisms have given rise to an alternative line of investigation, which
takes into account individuals’ preferences and represents a household by a pair of
or multiple utility functions with different budget constraints. Within this line, the
collective model is more prominent and puts less structure on the decision-making
process. This model does not impose the income pooling assumption, but assumes
that household members’ utility depends on their own consumption of goods and
leisure subject to individual-specific budget constraints.
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4.3.2 Collective Models
To provide a simple description of these models, I draw extensively from Chiappori
(1992). In collective models, individuals within a household interact through a bar-
gaining or income-sharing process which is assumed to take two stages. In the first
stage, individuals’ income share is first determined. Households may simply obtain
equal shares, or different shares as determined by a sharing rule. Income sharing thus
implies that the identity of the beneficiaries could potentially influence household
behavior differently.
Some characteristics may contribute to how pension income is shared. First,
cultural norms may obligate the elderly to offer financial support to younger rela-
tives, perhaps to support them in situations like a job search. Secondly, due to their
hierarchical position in the household, the elderly may possess more bargaining power,
and may consequently be less willing to share their OAP income with others. Lastly,
gender has been considered as another possible cause of variation in the sharing rule,
with a common belief that women are more altruistic than men. Equally, women
(especially the elderly) in an African setting are considered to have relatively lower
bargaining powers within a household, primarily due to cultural norms or because
they more often do not participate in the labor force and therefore do not have a
personal labor income. As a result, pension receipt may significantly improve their
standing in the household. The second stage involves individual utility maximization,
where one chooses consumption of goods and leisure, subject to an individual budget
constraint.
4.4 Data and Empirical Method
We use the General Household Survey (GHS). The survey is specifically designed
to measure living circumstances, performance of government programs, as well as
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quality of service delivery in various service sectors in the country. It covers six
broad areas, namely education, health and social development, housing, household
access to services and facilities, food security, and agriculture. Consequently, it is
well suited for this study. The main variables of interest are derived from household
questionnaires wherein each head of household is asked a series of questions regarding
the status of their household. In this paper we focus on the few categories mentioned
above, because given that they relate to expenditures and household well-being, are
most likely to be impacted by a change in household income.
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics of key variables broken down by gender and
pension age-eligibility status. We note a few differences in several key variables, such
as age and education. Not surprisingly, age-eligible individuals are relatively older. In
the case of years of schooling, for both males and females, eligible heads of household
are more likely to have fewer years of formal education (approximately 6 compared
to 7 for males, and 5 compared to 6 for females). They are also more likely to reside
in urban areas (67% compared to 59% for males, and 62% compared to 53% for
females). Overall, women are more likely to be widowed/divorced and to live alone
than men. The differences in marital status are consistent with women’s longer life
expectancy, as well as men’s greater likelihood of remarrying once widowed (Cohen
et al., 2006). For both males and females, the average household size is about 5 with
a high likelihood of the presence of children (approximately 60% or above with the
exception of the age-eligible males). The presence of co-residents in these households
also allows for the examination of food security for both adults and children in the
household. These differences do not invalidate our specification because, for instance,
age-eligible individuals are older by definition than those not yet age-eligible, thus
reflecting the age trend in some of these variables. Consequently, we control for the
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age trend as well as for the other variables in our regression estimation.
4.4.2 Identification Strategy
Our empirical approach relies on pension age-eligibility. While we do observe whether
or not an individual receives pension, we recognize that pension take-up is endogenous
whereas an individual’s age is not, and that a simple comparison of those that receive
the pension with those that do not would confound its impact with systematic dif-
ferences in key variables between the two groups. We therefore use the age-eligibility
requirement which provides an exogenous change in the budget constraint and conse-
quently allows for estimation of the pension’s causal impact at the age of eligibility.
This analysis is done at the household level and we limit our sample to households
with 50-75 year-old heads of household.
The identification strategy relies on the change in males’ minimum pension
age requirement. In order to validate the use of our identification strategy, we first
establish that the individuals responded to the 2008 pension reform that lowered,
in steps, males’ minimum pension age requirement from 65 to 60 years.10 We first
graph pension receipt by age for men and women. GHS asks adults whether or not
they receive the government Old Age Pension (OAP). As shown graphically to be
consistent with the data in Figure 4.1, the proportion of males receiving pension
benefits has an upward shift at 65 for 2006-2008, the period before the reform, and
at 60 for 2010-2012, the period after the reform. For females, the proportion of those
10The minimum pension age-eligibility had historically been at 60 years for women and 65 for men;
however, a 2008 pension reform lowered, in steps, men’s minimum pension age requirement from 65
to 60 years. During that transition period, the government extended pensions to men aged 63 and
older in 2008, and later to men aged 61 and older in 2009. It equaled that of women at 60 in 2010
(Ambler, 2015; Lombard and Kruger, 2009). As per the South African Social Assistance Amendment
Act, no. 6 of 2008, which made provision for a phased-in change, pension age requirements were
amended as follows: one is deemed pension age-eligible if (i) after 1 April 2008, one has attained
the age of 63 years; (ii) after 1 April 2009, one has attained the age of 61 years; or (iii) after 1 April
2010, one has attained the age of 60 years.
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receiving pension benefits follows a similar trend in both periods with an upward
shift at 60 years of age, the age at which they attain the minimum age-eligibility
requirement in both periods. Although the fraction of those reporting to receive the
pension is not complete after the eligibility age, and there is also some slippage in
pension receipt prior to the age of eligibility, the discontinuity is clear. The figure
also shows that many people take up the pension when age-eligible.
We note that our identification could be invalidated if there are other factors
that could be driving the results. For instance, the existence of another social assis-
tance program implemented for the same population group and with similar eligibility
criteria could invalidate our identification. As noted above, there are a number of
other social assistance programs implemented by the South African government; how-
ever, there are none that are similar to the OAP such that it could invalidate our
identification (Duflo, 2003).
Another issue of concern is that receiving a pension may cause households
to reorganize, therefore affecting the impact attributed to eligibility. For instance,
Edmonds et al. (2005) find evidence of an increase in the number of children and
young women in pension-eligible households, and a decrease in the number of prime-
age working women in pension-eligible households. Similarly, Hamoudi and Thomas
(2005) find similar results and note that those living with pension-eligible adults are
also more likely to have low levels of human capital. This household reorganization
has also been linked to labor force participation withdrawal. For example, Posel
et al. (2006) attribute an increase in the number of unemployed among households
with pension-eligible adults to the fraction that is unable or unwilling to work moving
in with the pension-eligibles to take advantage of the large guaranteed income, and
not from original residents withdrawing from labor force.11 These studies demon-
11This study is a critique of Bertrand et al. (2003)’s study. Bertrand et al. compare households
that have an age-eligible household member to those that do not and finds a sharp decline in
employment and labor supply responses by prime-age individuals residing in households containing
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strate that it is difficult to argue that receiving a pension does not impact household
composition, which has potential to impact some outcomes, but while that could be
the case, it would imply that our estimation could be understating the impact of
eligibility on some outcome measures, such as food security. If, for example, children
or non-working family members were to move into the household, any increase in
income through the pension would have less impact than it otherwise would in the
original household status.
4.4.3 Empirical Model
We estimate the following logit model:
Yh,t = α0 + α1Eligible
M
i,h,t + α2(X
M)i,h,t + α3Eligible
M
i,h,t ∗Marriedi,h,t
+ β1Eligible
F
i,h,t + β2(X
F )i,h,t + β3Eligible
F
i,h,t ∗Marriedi,h,t
+ θ1Hh,t + µh,t
(4.6)
where Yh,t is the outcome measure of interest, namely, food security, water and sanita-
tion, ownership of durable goods, and aggregated measure of well-being of household h
in year t. X is a vector of male, XM , and female, XF , head of household’s or spouse’s
controls including education, race, marital status, age (age dummies for males or age
quadratic for females), while H is a vector of h’s household and geographical controls
including time dummies, household size, number of children, a control for rural house-
holds, and geographical dummies for the nine South African provinces.12 EligibleM
is an indicator variable for whether or not a male head of household or spouse i in
household h is pension age-eligible while EligibleF indicates whether or not a female
head of household or spouse is pension age-eligible. The coefficients α1 and β1 on the
pension-eligible individuals and attribute it to withdrawal from the labor force of the individuals
that reside with the pensioners.
12We include age dummies for men, but a second order polynomial in age for females. The
inclusion of a polynomial control in women is to offset multicollinearity in age, year, and eligibility
for women because their eligibility age did not change like that of men.
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age-eligibility indicators are the coefficients of interest for single heads of household,
while the impact of pension age-eligibility for married heads of household includes
the coefficient of EligibleM x Married and EligibleF x Married, respectively.
4.5 Food Security
Despite some improvement over the last few decades, food security remains a global
concern and recent increases in global food prices and limited household purchasing
power has drawn attention back to the problem of food security. FAO/WFP/IFAD
(2012) estimates that millions of the world’s population are food insecure; in particu-
lar, the African continent suffers from extreme hunger and malnutrition. For example,
the 2015 report of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on the state of food
security in the world estimates that over 780 million people in developing countries
are undernourished. Out of these, an estimated 220 million live in Sub-Saharan Africa
(which includes South Africa) (FAO, 2015).13 Unlike most of the other Sub-Saharan
African countries, South Africa is politically and economical advanced, but the coun-
try is still plagued by high rates of poverty and unemployment which in turn subjects
a large number of households to food insecurity (Modirwa and Oladele, 2012).14 Its
seriousness is evidenced by the inclusion of eradication of hunger being part of the
country’s first Millennium Development Goal. In addition, food security was also a
key focus in the 2009 General Election Manifesto of the African National Congress
(ANC), a political party that has ruled since the end of apartheid rule. This mani-
13Measurements of food insecurity vary, but the most widely cited are the “undernourished”
estimates by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) which is based on country-level food
balance sheets and strong assumption on its distribution within a country. Other measures of food
insecurity, for instance those reported by the U.S. department of agriculture (USDA) to Congress
annually, are based on simulation models based on prices and national accounts and production
estimates often vary from the former (Barrett et al., 2010).
14According to The World Bank, South Africa’s 2010 poverty head count ratio, which is the
percentage of the population living below the national poverty line, was 53.8%. Unemployment
rates over the last 20 years have averaged over 20% (1996-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010, 2011-2015 as
24.7%, 25.0%, 34.6%, and 25.1%, respectively).
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festo built onto South Africa’s Integrated Food Security Strategy, which was meant
to improve the country’s food security status (Battersby, 2011).15
But what is food security? In its narrowest definition, food security is defined as
the availability of enough food at the global, national, community, or household level
(Pinstrup-Andersen, 2009).16 Accordingly, it can be measured at different levels:
global, national, regional, household or individual level. Pinstrup-Andersen points
out that the term “food security” was originally used to describe food accessibility at
the national level, but it was not clear whether self-sufficiency at the national level
meant that all citizens were also food secure. Nonetheless, a country with low levels
of income would be food insecure; therefore implying households would also be food
insecure. In the case of South Africa, studies show that the country is largely deemed
food secure at the national level; however, its high cases of household food insecurity
are tied to lack of food accessibility by certain groups of people (Vorster et al., 1997;
Vogel and Smith, 2002; Steyn et al., 1998, 2007).
Food accessibility is associated with individual and household ability to purchase
it. It is also tied to the choice and range of food a person or a household is able to
acquire/afford, given their income, prevailing market prices, and available safety nets
through which they can acquire food. It reflects the“demand side” implying that even
when food is available in the market (supply is met), some individuals or households
may not be able to meet their needs. As such, problems associated with adverse
shocks such as price spikes, unemployment, death of head of household, or loss of
15 Integrated Food Security Strategy is meant to attain universal physical, social and economic
access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food by all South Africans at all times to meet their dietary
and food preferences for an active and healthy life.
16The definition of food security has evolved over the years, and one agreed upon at the 2001
World Food Summit, states that:
“Food security [is] a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical,
social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their
dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO, 2001).
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livelihood-producing assets are more likely to heighten food insecurity (Barrett et al.,
2010). In the context of South Africa, a survey by Statistics South Africa (GHS, 2009)
reported that an estimated 20% of sampled households had inadequate or severely
inadequate food access. While this seems to be high, the prevalence of food insecurity
has in fact been reduced by more than half since 1999 (Labadarios et al., 2011).
A distinction is often made between chronic and acute food insecurity. The
former is characterized by a lack of minimum food for a sustained period of time
often due to extended periods of poverty, lack of assets, or lack of access to produc-
tive/financial resources. The latter is observed in households that are temporarily
unable to access enough food. This could be as a result of instability in food prices,
food production, or household incomes, and may also be associated with rare, but
acute declines in food access, such as in times of a famine (Chung, 1997). For exam-
ple, the rapid food price increase during 2007-2008 considerably increased the number
of food insecure individuals globally by a 100 million (FAO, 2009). Acute food in-
security can also be divided into temporary and cyclical food insecurity. Temporary
food insecurity occurs when sudden shocks such as drought and unemployment occur
and affects household food accessibility. Seasonal food insecurity occurs when there
is predictable and regular patterns of food inaccessibility. It is often linked to agri-
cultural seasons, especially when households are under budget constraints (Thomson
and Metz, 1999). Because majority of the low income households in South Africa
spend a higher share of their income on food, households that might be marginally
food secure before food price inflation, or famine, or unemployment shock might fall
into food insecurity afterwards, highlighting the importance of social protection to
counter the spread of hunger.
Experiences involving food insecurity range from the least to the most severe.
On the least severe end, it manifests as households worrying about food they can
obtain, and their coping mechanism involves a trade off of food quality for quantity
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through purchase of less expensive food. There is generally little reduction in quan-
tity of household members’ intake, if any. With the increase in the severity of food
insecurity, adults may to try to reduce quantity of food intake, or skip meals to an ex-
tent that they start to experience hunger. Hunger is defined as “the uneasy or painful
sensation caused by a lack of food [or] the recurrent and involuntary lack of access
to food” (Hamilton et al., 1997). Since adults tend to shield children from the effects
of food insecurity, children often do not experience it at this level. However, in the
most severe end, adults as well as children are forced to reduce their food intake such
that both adults and children consistently experience hunger (Cook and Jeng, 2009;
Klein, 1996). Like hunger, under-nutrition is an outcome of inadequate food intake;
however, the former refers to lack of sufficient micro-nutrients, such as key vitamins.
In children, a severe lack of adequate nutrition can manifest as being underweight and
stunted in growth. The South African National Food Consumption Survey (NFCS)
collects information on nutrition, height and weight, as well as household choices in
the context of limited income. In its 2005 report, NHCS indicated that approximately
33% of households are at risk for hunger, implying that inflation and loss of income
might push them to hunger (Labadarios et al., 2007).
Food insecurity is typically associated with limited resources (Hamilton et al.,
1997). Therefore, by definition, it is referred to as a resource-constrained or poverty-
related condition, and consequently financial resources available to a household, in-
cluding earned income, and public and private food assistance programs are crucial
in maintaining food resiliency. In South Africa, for example, Case and Deaton (1998)
observe that approximately 35% of black South Africans survive on US$1 a day, but
suggest that in the absence of the pension income, the figure would be 40%. Like-
wise, Delgado and Cardoso Jr (2000) compare households with a pension beneficiary
to those without in Brazil, and find that the proportion of households below the
poverty line is significantly lower in the former.
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The importance of food security is well established in the literature. Among
children, studies show that their physiological growth and development are sensitive
to having sufficient food (food security) and adequate nutrition (Fotso et al., 2012;
Casey et al., 2006; Martorell, 1999). This in turn impacts their school success and
consequently their labor market productivity. Children who face severe acute malnu-
trition (low weight for height) in early life are likely to have long term effects on brain
development even after malnutrition is addressed thereafter (Grantham-McGregor,
1995). Likewise, other studies observe that better nourished girls are more likely
to remain in school and to have more control of their future life choices (Chopra,
2004). The latter observation is of significance in a society where women have histor-
ically been discriminated against because investment in human capital among girls
has potential to reduce gender inequality. The long run implication of food security
thus implies a potentially vicious cycle among nutrition, health and economic growth.
Therefore, while many cash transfers, such as OAP in South Africa, are targeted to-
wards addressing contemporary poverty, they indirectly contribute in addressing long
term (inter-generational) pathways from poverty through improvement in human cap-
ital. As such, improving the nutritional status of small children may have important
returns in the long run (Behrman and Hoddinott, 2005).
4.5.1 Cash Transfers and Food Access
In principle, cash transfers have the potential to increase both quantity and quality
of food consumed. The poorest households, in particular, are more likely to increase
the quantity of food they consume, as measured in calories or number of meals per
day. More importantly, these households are less likely to skip meals. We are also
likely to observe that once their quantity reaches a threshold, their focus would turn
to the quality, such that they would diversify their diet. On a review of studies on
cash transfer, Arnold et al. (2011) observe that:
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“one of the strongest and most consistent findings regarding the impact
of cash transfer programmes is their contribution to reducing hunger and
food insecurity. Regardless of the form of transfer, households receiving
transfer average significantly higher spending on consumption of food.
The impact of cash transfer on hunger has been most pronounced in LICs
[low income countries] where poverty is generally more severe. In these
settings, households receiving additional income are particularly likely to
prioritize spending on improving the quantity and/ or quality of food
consumed.” (Arnold et al. (2011):20).
Evidence from southern Africa supports this hypothesis. For instance, the evaluation
of Malawi’s Food And Cash Transfer (FACT) showed that 75.5% of the cash transfers
were generally spent on groceries (Devereux et al., 2006). In Lesotho, Croome and
Nyanguru (2007) find that the number of elderly reporting that they never went
hungry increased from 19% to 48% after the old age pension program was introduced.
Studies specific to South Africa’s OAP find that approximately 45% of all black and
coloured households report that presence of a pensioner in the household reduces the
probability of an adult skipping a meal by 20% on average, and further reduces it by
40% in households with two pensioners (Case, 2002).
Access to the cash transfer can also improve quality of food as well as help
diversify a household’s diet (Vincent and Cull, 2009). Under Zambia’s Social Cash
Transfer (SCTs), in addition to a decrease in the number of beneficiary households
with one meal a day, or who reported hunger, households that received the cash trans-
fer consumed a richer diet than those that did not; 12% more households consumed
proteins and 35% consumed oil every day if they received the cash transfer, com-
pared to those that did not (Vincent and Cull, 2009).17 In Colombia, Attanasio and
17 Conditional Cash Transfer in Latin America has similar effects. Evidence from countries
such as Ecuador, Colombia, and Nicaragua also shows that beneficiary households tend to have
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Mesnard (2006) observe that households that benefited from Familias en Accion had
a significant increase in protein-rich food, such as meat and milk. Similar findings
are observed in Mexico and Nicaragua where the increase in food consumption was
driven by an increase in consumption of proteins, fruits, and vegetables (Hoddinott
et al., 2000; Maluccio and Flores, 2005).
Studies across a variety of cash transfer programs in developing countries also
find that beneficiaries are able to save and invest a fraction of their transfer in agri-
cultural inputs which in turn improves household food production. In Bolivia, for
example, a social transfer of US$246 called Bono Bignidad, is paid once a year to
individuals aged 60 and over. The amount represents a significant amount of income
to rural farmers who have lands but are in need of cash or sufficient credit to pur-
chase inputs such as seeds. Analyzing this program, Barrientos (2012) finds that
beneficiary households experienced an average increase in food consumption of ap-
proximately twice the value of the cash transfer, implying that the transfer facilitated
an investment of some portion of the transfer in other household food production.
4.5.2 Measures of Food Security
Researchers use a variety of proxies to measure food security, but generally the choice
among indicators are commonly dictated by the objective necessitating a study. That
said, measurement choices involve trade offs and more often, each measure captures
as well as overlooks different dimensions of food security that are of central impor-
tance to food security intervention. Historical estimates focused on food availability
at the national or regional levels, and consequently, intervention policies were aimed
higher food expenditure for any given household total expenditure (Holmes and Bhuvanendrah,
2013). Nonetheless, some studies do not find such positive effects. In Ecuador (The Bono de
Desarrollo Humano (BDH)) and in Cambodia (Cambodia Education Sector Support Project) do
not find improvement in the level of food consumption. Findings in the latter are perhaps due to
the fact that the cash transfer is small in size (Fiszbein et al., 2009).
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at strategies that were geared towards addressing national-level food availability is-
sues. The focus has, however, changed in the last few decades, shifting more towards
individual-specific measures, which in turn emphasizes food security strategies that
are based on poverty alleviation, food prices, and social protection policies (Barrett
et al., 2010).
How is household or individual food security measured? Food expenditure, di-
etary diversity (Arimond and Ruel, 2004), and coping strategies index (Maxwell, 1996)
are some proxies used that rely on individuals’ or households’ responses to past con-
sumption and economic shocks (Barrett et al., 2010). Others include hunger, which is
the physical discomfort as a result of lack of food and can be appropriately gathered
at the individual level, and anthropometric measures such as weight-for-height or
weight-for-age (Duflo, 2003), and malnutrition which refers to micro-nutrition (min-
eral and vitamin) deficiency, and undernutrition which refers to deficiency in protein
energy (University and Organization, 2004). In the context of the last two measures,
the 2005 NFCS revealed that 1 out of every 5 children aged between 1-9 years in
South Africa had stunted growth and was only a marginal improvement from the
1999 survey findings (Labadarios et al., 2007). These surveys also assist in predicting
groups that are more likely to be affected by shocks that could impact food security,
such as an increase in food prices and drought.18
4.5.3 Vulnerable Groups
In general, the population vulnerable to food insecurity can be defined as economically
or socially marginalized. Economically marginalized are those individuals that often
18 Studies show that while severe food insecurity is often linked to disasters such as war, floods,
and drought, most food insecurity is in fact not associated with those episodes; chronic poverty
is the major cause of food insecurity. For instance, approximately 92% of hunger-related deaths
worldwide were a result of chronic or recurring hunger and malnutrition, while only 8% were a result
of humanitarian emergencies [cite FAO 2006 Rome 2006].
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do not have land, capital, or formal skills. They make up the ‘working poor’ or the
‘under-employed poor’. The socially marginalized are those vulnerable as a result
of disability, illness, gender (women and girls), or age (elderly and children). This
group is also economically marginalized and consequently forms a large fraction of the
chronically poor sub-population. In South Africa, predisposing factors that lead to
food vulnerability differ across groups; some are associated with economic hardships,
such as income levels, size of landholdings, and types of crops grown; and some are
associated with household demographics status (e.g., gender of the household head,
presence of pregnant or lactating women, presence of school-aged children, presence of
anyone with a disability, or presence of an elderly person in the household) and issues
with distribution of food within households (Thomson and Metz, 1999; Ellis, 2003).
Nonetheless, food insecurity is generally linked to poverty because of the dimension
of food affordability; the most vulnerable households typically include those that lack
productive assets and are dependent on irregular income.
Food security at the household level is probably the most important for re-
searchers, in that the household is essentially the basic unit which dictates the level
of consumption for individuals. However, within these households, children (more of-
ten girls), women, elderly, widows, divorced women, and individuals with a disability
are the most vulnerable (Modirwa and Oladele, 2012; Ellis, 2003). For the elderly,
food insecurity is tied to lack of earning opportunities often due to their advanced age
or their deteriorating health status, in addition to the burden of care for the young,
orphans, and those with HIV/AIDS in their household. In South Africa, the majority
of them depend heavily on state welfare in the absence of a private pension, savings,
or assets.
Widows, divorced women, and female-headed households are susceptible to food
insecurity due to the loss of a previous partner’s contribution to household income.
This could also be attributed to low labor force participation rates among women,
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either due to socio-cultural factors, or due to low earning power for those that do
participate in the labor force as noted in Barros et al. (1997) in the context of Brazil.19
Likewise, in South Africa, like other African countries, social-cultural norms, such as
the right to resources by a particular group (often divorced women’s or widow’s rights
to share a husband’s wealth or inherit his property) also exacerbate their exposure
to food insecurity.
Households with a larger proportion of dependent members, such as children
and the elderly, are likely to be more vulnerable to food insecurity compared to those
households composed of a larger fraction of the working-age population. Nonetheless,
government social welfare programs for children (child care grants and foster care
grants) and the elderly (Old Age Pension) provide some safety nets that positively
impact food security (Patel and Hochfeld, 2011; Schatz et al., 2012). Households in
rural areas may also face food security primarily due to the over-reliance on agricul-
ture as a single source of livelihood. This lack of diversification often makes them
vulnerable to food insecurity when crops fail. People with a disability, HIV/AIDS,
or chronic illnesses often have less job opportunities or often suffer exclusion from
communities and therefore have less/or no labor market income, or assets to cover
high medical expenses associated with illnesses.
However, it is important to note that not all members of the aforementioned
groups face food insecurity. For example, not all female-headed households are vulner-
able (Quisumbing et al., 2001). More often than not, households facing food security
challenges cope by employing additional household members, including school-aged
19Some studies counter this argument, pointing out that while men earn more than women,
in general, female-headed households are no less food secure than their male counterparts. For
example, using survey data sets from 10 developing countries, Quisumbing et al. (2001) compare
poverty measures for males and females and male-headed and female-headed households and finds
only a fifth to a third of the data shows significant differences. They do, however, conclude that the
results (where females are consistently worse than males) may driven by cultural and institutional
factors.
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children, in income-generating activities. This has policy implication in that failure
to invest in human capital is more likely to increase the probability of transmitting
poverty to the next generation (Modirwa and Oladele, 2012).
4.5.4 Results
Ideally we would prefer to examine whether pension income impacts household food
expenditure, but the General Household Survey (GHS) does not provide this infor-
mation for 2006-2008. However, it collects detailed information at the household and
individual level from which we are able to observe a sense of food security for adults
and children in a particular household using the following questions as a proxy:
1. For adults: “In the past 12 months, did any adult (18 years and above) in this
household go hungry because there wasn’t enough food?”
2. And for children: “In the past 12 months, did any child (17 years or younger)
in this household go hungry because there wasn’t enough food?”
with possible responses being on a 5-grade scale – ‘never’, ‘seldom’, ‘sometimes’,
‘often’, or ‘always’.
As a first step in our analysis, we present average responses across different
household types. The rationale for doing this is to compare households with an age-
eligible adult to those without. Household types are broken down by that of single
males, single females, and married couples. We further breakdown married couple
households into those wherein only the husband is age-eligible, those wherein only
the wife is age-eligible, those wherein both spouses are age-eligible, and finally those
wherein neither the husband nor the wife is age-eligible. See Table 4.2 for adult food
security and Table 4.3 for children’s food security.
Overall these tables reveal that the majority of sampled households are food
secure; however, there are differences based on household types. For single house-
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holds, the percentage of those that respond to “never go to bed hungry” ranges from
approximately 77-83%, which is relatively lower compared to married households,
which ranges from 84-91%, as such it is an indication of relative more food insecurity.
We also observe that pension age-eligible households are relatively food secure than
households that are not pension age-eligible; households that have an age-eligible
adult have higher percentages of favorable responses compared to those that do not
have an eligible adult. This observation is roughly consistent across gender. Not
surprisingly, married households wherein both spouses are age-eligible are more food
secure compared to those that have neither couple being age-eligible, or where only
one spouse is age-eligible.
In summary, we observe that households that are pension age-eligible are more
likely to be food secure, especially households with age-eligible females – patterns
that are further analyzed in a regression framework below.
Regression Analysis
In this section we address the question whether pension age-eligibility and gender of
the eligible individual impacts food security in a formal regression framework setting.
We use an ordered logit model described in section 4.4.3. The dependent variable,
food security, is coded on a four point scale: 0=Always, 1= Often, 2=Sometimes,
3=Seldom, and 4=Never, where higher values represent better status.
The expected patterns given the tabular analysis above are observed in the re-
gression results presented in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 for adults’ and children’s food security
status, respectively. For each sample there are three specifications: column (1) in-
cludes only the individual controls. One threat to our results is the possibility that
household structure may influence the outcome. We address this issue by controlling
for household size and the number of children in the household in column (2), as well
as a control for the presence of other non-spousal residents in sampled households in
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column (3).
The resulting estimates in column (1) suggests that for single males, age-eligibility
is not likely to have a significant impact on adults’ food security status in their house-
holds; the coefficient on males’ eligibility is negative, but insignificant. On the other
hand, the coefficient on single females is positive and significant, implying that age-
eligibility for single females is likely to have a favorable outcome for their households.
The coefficient on married dummy variable is positive and significant. However, the
estimated males’ eligibility x married dummy variable interaction term coefficient,
which captures the difference in the effect between single and married households,
while positive, is not significant at the conventional levels. Females’ eligibility x mar-
ried dummy variable interaction term coefficient, on the other hand, is negative but
its impact is relatively small and statistically insignificant. The results suggest that
female’s eligibility status, whether single or married, has a positive impact on their
food security status, unlike that of males.
We mentioned above that many children in South Africa reside with elderly
family members and that studies find positive impacts on children’s outcomes such
as health and schooling when residing with the pensioners (Duflo, 2003; Edmonds,
2006). Here we examine the impact of age-eligibility on children’s food security, an
outcome that is likely to be influenced by pension eligibility status. We note that
not all households have children, and therefore, in addition to the above responses
to the food security questions, households without children have a ”not applicable”
option and are consequently excluded from the current analysis. This decreases our
estimation sample. Table 4.5 presents the estimates. Once again, in column (1)
our estimates indicate that males’ age-eligibility status does not have a significant
impact on children’s food security status in their households. These findings hold
whether they are singles or married. In contrast, the impact of females’ age-eligibility
is positive, significant, and consistent whether married or not.
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With the additional controls (columns (2) and (3)) age-eligibility impacts on
food security outcomes do not change by much from the first specification, but we
observe that households are less likely to be food secure as the number of residents and
the number of children increases. Presence of other non-spousal age-eligible residents
is positive, as expected, but only significant for adults’ food security. Importantly,
the similarity in estimated effects on age-eligibility status across the different speci-
fications is reassuring and suggest that our coefficients of interest are not capturing
effects that should be attributed to other eligible co-residents.
4.5.5 Discussion
So far these findings provide some evidence that age-eligibility status has very different
effects based on gender, in favor of females, and points in the direction of rejecting the
unitary model in favor of the bargaining models. The bargaining models, discussed
above, that guide our analysis are based on the assumption that control of household
resources influences the decision-making process within a household, such that those
with more control of the resources are likely to have more decision-making powers as
well. In our case, however, while men, like women, exhibit a discontinuous increase in
pension receipt at the eligibility age, the impact of age-eligibility for married females
is positive and statistically significant on both cases (for adults’ and children’s food
security), but their male counterpart is not. Consequently, if bargaining model theory
– that decision-making power increases upon age-eligibility – is to guide our results,
the non-results in the case of male’s age-eligibility status is puzzling.
Income Share and Control
An important question is whether or not control of income is the channel through
which the observed difference in age-eligibility effect is operating. Relevant to our
analysis, using NIDS data, Ambler (2015) plots the fraction of household income
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earned or received by an elderly adult by age and observes a striking increase in
income controlled by females at the eligibility age, but a small and noisy increase for
males. Ambler also observes that there is a strong correlation between the percentage
of a household’s income one controls and the probability that he/she is the primary
decision-maker in a household for both men and women, regardless of their pension
eligibility status. She notes, however, that while there is an observed increase in
individually controlled income, there is little or no evidence of an increase in household
total income for either males or females. This is consistent with other studies that find
crowding out effects from private transfers, such as remittances previously received
by the households (Jensen, 2004), as well as evidence that pension receipt discourages
labor force participation (Lam et al., 2006). Therefore, to the extent that decision-
making powers within a household are determined through income control, then the
pronounced increase in income control observed in women, and less in men, could
provide a convincing explanation for why we do observe a positive impact on women’s
age-eligibility status on food security and not on men’s.
Other Potential Explanations
There is a possibility that men do not respond to pension eligibility like women
do. To examine this, we plot pension participation against age for men and women,
respectively in Panel A of Figures 4.2 and 4.3. Because the age-eligibility requirement
for men decreased from 65 to 60 between 2008 and 2010, the solid lines represents
the trend before the change and the dashed line represents the trend after. In both
figures we observe that pension participation has a visible upward discontinuity at
60 and 65 for men and at 60 for women, as expected. This corresponds with their
respective minimum pension age requirement and implies a substantial take-up upon
reaching the age of eligibility. In addition, studies show that OAP is generously
high by world standards, such that its cash transfers are almost twice the median per
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capita African/black income (Ardington et al., 2007), clearly indicating its significance
relative to other household incomes. Therefore, given that we observe a sharp increase
in pension participation at the eligibility age for both men and women, why do studies
fail to observe a corresponding increase in the fraction of household income controlled
by males but observe one in females?
A possible explanation for the findings is that the pension income for men
is partly offset by loss/reduction in earned income due to labor force withdrawal
or reduction in working hours. However, evidence shows both males’ and females’
withdrawal from the labor force occurs at the age of eligibility (Lam et al., 2006).
One way to test this theory is to examine changes in actual labor income by age for
both males and females, but our data does not provide that information. Instead, in
Panel B of Figures 4.2 and 4.3, we plot employment rates against age for men and
women, respectively. Clearly, there is a downward trend in employment with age,
and in line with the previous studies, we observe a discontinuity in the fraction of
those employed at their respective eligibility age. Interestingly, this discontinuity is
more pronounced for males than for females, suggesting that their withdrawal is more
rapid than that of females, and may offer evidence as to why men’s income is likely
to decrease by a larger fraction once they reach the eligibility age.
In addition, evidence shows that men, on average, earn more than women in
the labor market and that their income is a significant part of their household budget
(Ambler, 2015). Consequently, while we observe that both men and women withdraw
from the labor force at the eligibility age, the income that men give up is thus higher
than females, and the subsequent pension income may more likely be a larger increase
in women’s income. We offer an illustration in Figure 4.4. This figure shows how the
introduction of a pension shifts the budget constraint of an otherwise unpensioned
individual. Income is on the vertical axis and hours worked on the horizontal axis
(moving from A to T). Without OAP, the budget constraint is ABH with slope W
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and intercept B. AB is individual’s non-labor income. With OAP, BC is the pension
guarantee (i.e., the maximum amount given to those with zero income or those under
the exempted income level), therefore creating the budget segment given by ACEFH.
As noted earlier, women’s labor force participation is relatively lower than that
of men. In addition, women typically earn relatively less than men as well. Consider a
case where women are located at point 1 and men at point 3, in the absence of OAP.
These women have two types of responses: they either reduce hours (and relocate
to point 2) or withdraw from the labor force; however, the change in labor supply
depends on their initial location on BF , such that those closer to B are more likely to
relocate to C (withdraw from labor force). For simplicity, let’s assume they relocate
to point 2. Also, for simplicity, and given that men have a flatter income expansion
path, assume men relocate from point 3 to 4 upon pension age-eligibility. As observed
in the graph, the change in income experienced by women (from a to b) is larger than
that experienced by men (c to d). Thus, while we expect individuals to respond by
reducing labor supply or exiting the labor force upon pension age-eligibility, these
considerations may offer additional support to the argument that the pension income
may be a replacement for the lost labor market income for males more than it is for
females.
Household Rearrangement
An important concern for our results, as discussed earlier, is household reorganization
documented in previous studies (Hamoudi and Thomas, 2005). For instance, some
studies find an increase in the number of children and a decrease in women of working-
age in households with pensioned females. Others observe that the individuals living
with the pensioners are likely to have lower human capital, and therefore less likely to
be employable. To that end, we examine whether our results are driven by changes in
household size, or specifically the number of children in the household. We, however,
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hypothesis that even if these patterns were present in our data, they are more likely to
understate our results. We use the same specification used in estimating the impact
of age-eligibility on food security, but our dependent variables are household size and
the number of children.
Table 4.6 presents the results from these regressions. A decrease in the number
of family members would suggest that our positive results are simply due to the
household becoming smaller and therefore more resources can be shared among a
smaller number. On the other hand, an increase would imply that family members
are in fact taking advantage of the pension, and consequently our positive results are
indeed understated. We do not find evidence to suggest that either of the above is
exhibited in our sampled households. We also note that the basic findings of Tables
4.4 and 4.5 do not change with inclusion or exclusion of family size.
4.6 Other Household Outcomes
4.6.1 Water and Sanitation
Provision of clean water and adequate sanitation facilities plays a considerable role
in the improvement of public health. While these two are not necessary areas of con-
cern in the US or other western countries, studies show that in developing countries,
water and sanitation services are severely deficient, and are therefore a major public
health issue that subjects millions to preventable illness and consequently death every
year (WHO/UNICEF, 2004). One constraint for households wanting to connect to
improved water supply, especially for poor households, is affordability. Other factors
that lead to low rates of connection to improved services include easier accessibility
to low quality water that is suitable for other purposes (apart from drinking), desire
to be independent from only one single source, and lack of awareness of water quality
(Akbar et al., 2007; Spencer, 2007; Hadipuro and Indriyanti, 2009). In this section
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we explore the link between pension age-eligibility and access to improved water and
sanitation services, two measures that are likely to be associated with an increase in
household income (White et al., 2008).
Estimates of access to water and sanitation at the global level are startling. For
example, it is estimated that more than 1 billion people (about 15% of the total world
population) do not have access to an improved drinking water supply, and even more,
an estimated 2.6 billion people (about 35% of the total world population) do not
have improved sanitation services. Of the above, the majority reside in Sub-Saharan
Africa and in Asia (Montgomery and Elimelech, 2007). It should be noted that these
figures could be much higher because in the above case, the term “improved” access
to water or sanitation, does not necessarily suggest that the two meet international
health standards, such as those set by the World Organization (WHO), but it rather
represents water sources that are superior to traditional, unprotected water sources.
Table 4.7 breaks down water sources and sanitation facilities as defined by WHO.
The fraction of population, by region, that is without access to improved water
and sanitation is illustrated in Figure 4.5. In order to demonstrate how access to
both water and sanitation impact health, the figure also shows the number of deaths
attributable to diarrheal diseases per 1000 children under 1 year of age. From the
figure, it is clear that Sub-Saharan Africa faces the most severe conditions, where
approximately 40% of the population is without improved water and over 60% is
without improved sanitation. The correlation between lack of improved water and
sanitation facilities is also evident; deaths related to diarrheal diseases are much higher
in the Sub-Saharan African region than in others. Although not exhaustive, as the
connection between water, sanitation, and health is extensive and complex, studies
link these adverse health effects to poor drinking water quality or poor sanitation as
summarized in Table 4.8. This table highlights various ways in which both water and
sanitation play a part in the transmission of diseases caused by pathogenic micro-
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organisms, and also indicates how several transmission pathways may lead to similar
infection outcomes.
Diseases transmitted through poor quality drinking water or poor human waste
disposal, especially for those that are transmitted through the fecal-oral route are
well documented in literature (Esrey et al., 1991). Sources of the pathogens (bacte-
rial, viral and parasitic organisms) are often human (sometimes animal) feces which
often cause diseases when ingested by a susceptible person, with the shortest route
of transmission being poor hygiene (person-to-person contact). The longest route
includes transfer of the pathogens to food crops, more often through irrigation using
contaminated water, or through drinking contaminated water. However, a common
route depends on the characteristics of the specific pathogens and local environmental
standards as well as human behaviors (Pru¨ss et al., 2002).
Evidence of Causality
Availability of adequate water supply is linked to reduced cases of sanitation and
hygienic diseases. Using distance to water sources as a proxy for access to adequate
water supply and its use, Mathur et al. (1970), for example, observe that in India,
individuals whose water supply was within 200 meters exhibited 30% fewer cases of
trachoma than those who obtained it from sources farther away, while in Malawi there
were 26% fewer cases of trachoma among children whose water was obtained from
less than 5 minutes away than among those whose water was obtained from 1 hour
away (Tielsch et al., 1988).20 In South Africa, most households have access to some
form of piped water; however, this is more than 200 meters away for approximately
14% of households, while also about 8% still utilize rivers, streams or dams, therefore
20Trachoma is a contagious eye disease and is the leading cause of preventable blindness of
infectious origin. It is caused by Chlamydia trachomatis. Transmission occurs by several routes, all
of which are hygiene-related; for example, through direct contact, shared towels, and clothes and is
spread in areas that lack adequate access to water and sanitation.
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placing residents at risk for diseases (Lewin et al., 2007).
Sanitation (human waste management) also plays a significant role in the isola-
tion/distraction of pathogenic material, thus providing a breakdown in their transmis-
sion pathway. For example, in Indonesia, Toma et al. (1999) report a 64% reduction
in infection in people who used a latrine compared to those that did not. Other
experimental studies, for example Arfaa et al. (1977), have provided evidence of a
parallel decrease in both egg counts in the soil and cases of infections with an in-
crease in use of latrines.21 Other studies, for example Narain et al. (2000), note that
family size and lack of sanitation facilities (open defecation) is associated with cases
of Trichuris. Similarly, Rajeswari et al. (1994) note that among other reasons, its
prevalence is associated with factors such as water supply, disposal of feces, social
economic status, and family size.22
Globally, approximately 60% of infant mortality is linked to infectious diseases,
most of them related to water or sanitation. In developing countries, diarrheal diseases
are the principal cause of morbidity and mortality and are linked to approximately
4.9/1000 mortality of children under 5 years of age every year (Kosek et al., 2003;
Pru¨ss et al., 2002). Relevant to our study, it is estimated that diarrheal diseases
account for approximately 3% of total deaths – the eighth largest cause of death in
21According to the Center for Disease Control (CDC), Ascariasis is caused by the round worms
Ascaris lumbricoids (sometimes called Ascaris). The Ascaris live in the intestine and its eggs are
passed in the human feces of an infected person if feces are deposited on soil or used as fertilizer.
Ingestion of these eggs causes the disease. Transmission is attributed to water, sanitation, or poor
hygiene (e.g., when hands or fingers that have touched contaminated surfaces are put in the mouth,
or consuming vegetables or fruit that is not carefully washed, peeled, or cooked. Under favorable
conditions, the eggs can survive for months or years and, therefore, can pose a health hazard for a
long time.
22According to the Center for Disease Control (CDC), Shigella is a group of bacteria that causes
the infectious disease called Shigellosis. Most of those infected with the bacteria develop diarrhea,
fever, and stomach cramps starting a few days after the exposure; however, some may not have
symptoms at all, but may still pass the bacteria to others. Trichuris is caused by the whipworm
Trichuriasis trichiura. These worms live in the large intestines and their eggs are passed in the feces
of an infected person. If defecation is done outside or the human feces are used as fertilizer, these
eggs are deposited on the soil. Thus the infection is not from person-to-person, but the mode of
transmission is fully attributable to water, sanitation, and hygiene.
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South Africa (Bradshaw et al., 2003; Norman et al., 2006) and 11% of all deaths
among children under 5 years old, which is the third largest cause of death among
this age group (Hutton et al., 2007). 23 Similarly, Lewin et al. (2007) report that
2.6% of all deaths in South Africa were attributed to unsafe water, sanitation and
hygiene. The burden was particularly high in children under 5 years, accounting for
approximately 9.3% of total deaths.
In developing countries, the issue of water contamination goes beyond its sources;
most water is exposed to contamination during distribution and in storage within
homes. For instance, in VanDerslice and Briscoe (1993)’s literature review, they
point out that a number of observational studies documenting increased concentra-
tion of coliform levels (an indicator of an increase in contamination) in household
water storage containers than in the original source of water, thus emphasizing the
significance of access to running water within the dwelling.
Adverse health effects associated with lack of water extends beyond the burden
of the diseases. In many developing countries, water collection, which is often the
responsibility of women and children (especially girls), poses an additional burden.
In some cases, up to 6 hours a day may be spent in search of water for household
needs (WHO/UNICEF, 2005). For girls, the time spent searching or collecting water
may increase their probability of dropping out of school, while for the women, it
may take time away from opportunities to engage in other household chores or small
business opportunities. That said, diseases related to poor quality drinking water
and sanitation disproportionately affects poorer members of the community. While
reasons behind this are complex and interconnected, wealthier people are more likely
to have better access to water (piped water) and sewer systems.
23HIV/AIDS (30%) and cardiovascular diseases (16.6%) are the two leading cause-of-death cate-
gories (Bradshaw et al., 2003)
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Results
To obtain data on a household’s main source of drinking water, the survey asks:
“What is the household’s main source of drinking water?” Possible responses in-
clude ‘piped (tap) water in dwelling/house’, ‘piped (tap) water in yard’, ‘borehole
in yard’, ‘rain-water tank in yard’, ‘neighbor’s tap’, ‘public/communal tap’, ‘water-
carrier/tanker’, ‘borehole outside yard’, ‘flowing water/stream/river’, ‘stagnant wa-
ter/dam/pool’, ‘well’, and ‘spring’. We recode these categories into a 5-grade scale:
4=‘Tap water in dwelling, or on site, or in yard’, 3=‘neighbor’s tap or public tap’,
2=‘borehole on site or communal borehole, or water-carrier/tanker or rain-water tank
on site’, 1= ‘well or spring’, and 0=‘flowing water, or stream, or river, or dam, or pool,
or stagnant water’– with higher values denoting better sources of drinking water. See
Table 4.9 for a formal definition.
The GHS survey collects information on the main type of toilet facility used by
each household which we use as a proxy for sanitation. The survey asks: “What type
of toilet facility is used by this household?”, with possible responses ranging from lack
of it to the most improved toilet facility– a flushing toilet. Household responses are on
a 7-grade scale– ‘No toilet on site’, ‘bucket toilet’, ‘pit latrine without ventilation’, ‘pit
latrine with ventilation’, ‘chemical toilet’, ‘flush toilet that deposits waste to a septic
tank’, and ‘flush toilet that deposits to public sewage’. We define these categories in
Table 4.10.
We first present means of households’ sources of drinking water and access to
toilet facilities in Tables 4.11 and 4.12. We break it down by household type: single
male, single female, and married couple households and by age-eligibility status. In
terms of water sources, an average of 69% of single households reported to have access
to either tap water in the dwelling, or on site, or in the yard, which is lower compared
to the proportion of married households who average 73%. Overall, approximately
90% of all households reported to have access to any form of tap water (in dwelling,
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on site, in the yard, neighbor’s tap or public tap). Across all household groups,
we observe that eligible households are less likely to have access to improved water
sources; for example, approximately 2% lower for single males, 3% for single females,
and 2% for married couples when only the husband is age-eligible.
Access to improved toilet facilities is not as prevalent: approximately 47% of
single males, 49% of single females, and 38% of married households do not have
access to a flushing toilet or a chemical toilet. Importantly, approximately 9% of
single males, 8% of single females, and 4-6% of sampled married households utilize
bucket toilets or do not have access to any form of toilet facility.24
Regression Results
We examine water sources and access to sanitation facilities further in a regression
setting. We estimate an ordered logit model, as described in section 4.4.3, where
the dependent variable is a household’s main type of toilet facility or main source of
water, respectively. We acknowledge that households in rural areas are at a disad-
vantage because they are less likely to have infrastructure for piped water or sewer
systems. We also keep in mind that one of the factors that hinder households, par-
ticularly poor ones in rural areas, from having water connection is the initial capital,
as indicated above. Therefore, to control for this concern, we add an age-eligibility x
urban interaction term.
Results for water sources are presented in Table 4.13. Model 1 regresses the
dependent variable on indicator variables for age-eligibility, and a full set of con-
24The World Health Organization considers improved sanitation facilities as flush toilets, latrines
that flush to a sewer, septic tanks or pits, ventilated pit latrines, pit latrines with the pit well covered
by a slab, composting toilets, or chemical toilets, while unimproved sanitation facilities are open pits,
latrines without a proper slab to cover the pit, or hanging latrines which deposit untreated waste
into water systems or in the open (WHO/UNICEF, 2006) As such, approximately 32% of single
households and 23%- 30% of sampled married households do not have access to improved sanitation
facilities.
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trol variables described in section 4.4.3, with an exclusion of age-eligibility status
of co-residents and age-eligibility x urban interaction term. Males’ eligibility coef-
ficient is positive, but not significant. Males’ eligibility x married is negative, but
not significant as well. Females’ coefficients are both negative and not significant, as
well. Additional controls (presence of non-spousal eligible resident in model 2 and
age-eligibility x urban in model 3) do not significantly change the estimates. Put to-
gether, these results suggest that pension age-eligibility does not have much influence
on a household’s source of water. One possible explanation for our results is that the
majority (approximately 90%) of sampled households have access to some form of
tap water, e.g., in dwelling, on site, in the yard, neighbor’s tap, or from a public tap,
which are considered relatively better sources, and this could be driving the lack of,
or the limited effect.
In the case of sanitation, Table 4.14, we observe that males’ age-eligibility co-
efficient is negative and insignificant, whether single or otherwise. For females, we
see that age-eligibility has a positive and significant coefficient and the interaction
term for female’s age-eligibility x married is also positive, but not significant at the
conventional level. When we control for the presence of non-spousal eligibility status
in model 2, we observe that estimates do not have noticeable changes in magnitude or
significance; however, we note that while not significant, the presence of non-spousal
age-eligibility status is positive. With rural households being the group that face
tougher challenges in terms of accessing piped water or the sewer system, it is con-
ceivable that the impact of increased income may reduce their budget constraint and
provide them with the initial capital. Model 3 adds age-eligibility x urban term to
control for this, and as a result, the males’ age-eligibility coefficient changes from
negative to positive, but remains insignificant for singles, and remains relatively the
same (negative and insignificant) for the married, implying that males’ age-eligibility
status (single or married) is less likely to have a positive impact on their household’s
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sanitation facilities. On the other hand, females’ age-eligibility coefficient is posi-
tive and significant across the three specifications. Females’ age-eligibility x married
is positive, but not significant. Nonetheless, our result suggests that females’ age-
eligibility increases the probability of better facilities, an impact that is not observed
in males’ and thus supports the idea that cash in the hands of females is spent in
more productive ways than in the hands of men (Thomas, 1990; Duflo, 2003).
4.6.2 Ownership of Consumer Durables
Old Age Pension may also provide recipients with an ability not only to improve
their quality of life through day-to-day purchases of daily goods, such as food, but
can also afford them an opportunity to invest in larger household goods that also have
potential to improve their quality of life. For example, Ambler (2015) and Ashraf et al.
(2010) observe that an increase in decision-making powers associated with increased
personal income due to pension receipt is often correlated with increased ownership
of durable goods. The GHS survey data offers an opportunity to study a similar
question, but in a different setting. The survey collects information on ownership of a
number of consumer durable goods. Here we consider cellphones, televisions, radios,
and land-lines because they are more consistent across the survey. The survey only
asks whether a household owns particular durable goods, and therefore we cannot
observe how many of the durable goods they own. We also note that households
may use pension income to replace goods that they already have. Unfortunately, we
cannot observe that as well, thus the dependent variable is whether a household owns
a particular durable good or not.
Graphical analysis
To have a basic assessment of the impact of age-eligibility on ownership of consumer
durables, Figures 4.6 through 4.9 present averages of these variables by household
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type: single male, single female, and married couple households, and by age-eligibility
status. First, unlike the single male households, single female households are more
likely to own a phone; however, we observe that the likelihood of ownership is not dif-
ferent between age-eligible households and those that are not age-eligible, as observed
in the former. See Figure 4.6. For married couples, we do not observe noticeable dif-
ferences between households where only the husband is age-eligible and where neither
spouse is age-eligible. Interestingly, we observe a similar trend when only the wife is
age-eligible as was the case for the single female households, such that eligible house-
holds have a lower probability of phone ownership. This is also true for the case of
both spouses being age-eligible; however, the difference is notably smaller in the lat-
ter. See Figure 4.7. These observations are puzzling given that we hypothesize that
the worst case scenario for an eligible household would be a no effect. We examine
this further in a regression framework below.
An overwhelming majority of sampled households own either a television or a
radio, but once again single female households are more likely to own one compared
to the single male households (approximately over 90% compared to approximately
85%). We also note that in the case of single male households, age-eligible households
are more likely to own one, but we do not observe any noticeable differences for single
female households. See Figure 4.8. In the case of married couples, we observe a
slight decrease in probability of ownership when only one spouse is age-eligible, and
no noticeable difference in the case where both spouses are age-eligible compared to
where neither is age-eligible. We would expect a positive effect, but again, as shown
in Figure 4.9, a majority of the households own either a television or a radio, which
could explain the lack of, or limited, difference between those eligible and those not.
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Regression analysis
We examine this further using the same logit model described in section 4.4.3. The
dependent variables here are ownership of either a television or a radio, and ownership
of either a cellphone or a land-line phone. The binary variable is equal to 1 if a
household responds in the affirmative, 0 otherwise. We present the marginal effect
in Table 4.15. Columns (1) and (3) regresses dependent variables on an indicator
variable for age-eligibility and a full set of individual controls as well as the interaction
of urban and pension age-eligibility dummy variables. Columns (2) and (4) add
control for household size, as well as presence of non-spousal household members
that potentially could impact ownership of these goods.
Focusing on Columns (1) and (2), both males’ and females’ pension age-eligibility
estimates show that, on average, their households are less likely to own household
durable goods; however, these estimates are not significant at conventional levels.
The coefficient of females’ age-eligibility x married dummy variable interaction term
is positive and significant. We interpret this as an indication that married women
appear to channel some of their pension income towards the purchase of consumer
durable goods; on average, their eligibility increases the likelihood of phone owner-
ship by 3%. Consistent with our graphical analysis, it does not seem that pension
age-eligibility leads to ownership of either a television or a radio, which we attribute
to the fact that the majority of the sampled households own one. We also note
that households in urban areas are more likely to own both a television or radio and
phones.
4.6.3 Aggregated Measure
While we have explored a number of selected household items separately, an as-
sessment of the overall context would provide a more comprehensive picture of a
household’s well-being. To this end, we follow Chetty et al. (2010) and Kling et al.
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(2007) and construct a summary index that aggregates information over the previous
outcomes, namely food security, ownership of consumer durable goods, sanitation,
and source of drinking water. We assume the outcomes are closely related and to
be moving in the same direction, as a result this aggregation improves our statistical
power.
The summary index, Y , is constructed such that it has equal weighted average of
the standardized z-score of its 6 components. Each of the 6 outcomes is standardized
by subtracting its mean and dividing it by its standard deviation. The resulting
standardized score therefore has a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. To illustrate
this, let Yn be the n
th outcome of N outcomes, µn the mean of the outcome, and σn
its standard deviation. The normalized outcome is then: Y ∗n=(Yn−µn/σn). We then
sum up the individual standardized scores and divide them by the standard deviation
of the sum, Y ∗ =
n∑
i=1
Y ∗n /N , obtaining an index that has a standard deviation of
1. Henceforth, a higher index represents better outcomes and the summary index is
interpreted as a broader measure of a household’s well-being.
Results
To assess the impact of pension age-eligibility on household well-being, we estimate a
linear model described in section 4.4.3. The dependent variables measure the overall
well-being of a household (based on the above 6 aggregated measures). Results are
presented in table 4.16. There are three specifications: Column (1) includes only the
individual controls; we control for household size and the number of children in the
household in Column (2); and finally control for the presence of other non-spousal
residents in Column (3). Once again, the coefficient on males’ age-eligibility is nega-
tive, however insignificant at conventional levels. While its interaction with married
dummy variable is positive, the coefficient is insignificant as well, implying that males’
age-eligibility, whether single or married, is less likely to have a significant effect on the
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overall well-being of their households. On the other hand, single females’ estimates
are positive and significant across the three specification. Females’ age-eligibility x
marriage dummy variable coefficient, while negative, is small and insignificant in mag-
nitude, an indication that women do appear to channel their pension income to these
household consumption items.
4.7 Conclusion
Cash transfers can empower poor and credit-constrained households through the con-
sumption of selected items, which in turn may improve their overall well-being. This
study uses the South African Old Age Pension (OAP) to estimate the program’s age-
eligibility impact on food security for both adults and the children residing with them,
quality of drinking water and access to sanitation facilities, and ownership of house-
hold durable goods. In addition, we examine whether the impact of age-eligibility is
influenced by gender.
One of the primary goals for the OAP to elderly South Africans is to alleviate
poverty, particularly for the elderly that do not have access to a private pension. The
significance of OAP is highlighted by the fact that it is a very generous source of
income which provides older men and women with a guaranteed income that places
them above the median income distribution of the country (Hamoudi and Thomas,
2005). In some cases, this can be the only source of income for certain households. A
number of studies have also shown that the majority of the elderly reside with younger
individuals (e.g., working-age population and grandchildren), and as a result, their
pension potentially reaches other residents as well.
The results of this study demonstrate that pension age-eligibility has a positive
impact on the majority of the measured outcomes; however, this has been observed
on selected items for females, not males. Since pensioned households are more likely
to be severely budget constrained, any increase in household income, as in the case of
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receiving the OAP, is more likely to be spent on more pressing needs, like food. This
could explain why we observe positive and significant effects on food security and less
on other measured outcomes. Also, the bargaining model of the household predicts
that the increase in the share of income experienced by women when they become
age-eligible leads to an increase in their bargaining power within their household and
consequently causes the observed results. These positive improvements in measured
household outcomes for female age-eligibility, but not that of males, is consistent with
previous results (Duflo, 2003; Lundberg et al., 1997) that have been used to argue
that social programs aimed at women result in more productive uses. Nonetheless, the
interpretations in this study should be taken with caution because they are based on
a reduced form analysis and more understanding of complex intra-household income
dynamics is needed.
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4.8 Figures
Figure 4.1: Pension Receipt by Gender
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Note: These panels present changes in the fraction of males and females that
report to be on OAP by age. Figures are compiled using the 2006-2012 GHS data.
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Figure 4.2: Males: Pension Receipt and Employment by Age
0
20
40
60
80
100
%
 O
AP
 R
ec
ei
pt
50 55 60 65 70 75
Age
2006−2008 2010−2012
A
0
20
40
60
%
  E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
50 55 60 65 70 75
Age
2006−2008 2010−2012
B
Note: These panels present change in the fraction of males who report to be on pension
(Panel A) and employment rates (panel B) by age, before and after the pension reform.
We collapse years before the reform into one graph and years after the reform into another
graph. The transition year is omitted. Figures compiled using the 2006-2012 GHS data.
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Figure 4.3: Females: Pension Receipt and Employment by Age
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Note: These panels present change in the fraction of females who report to be on pension
(Panel A) and employment rates (panel B) by age, before and after the pension reform.
We collapse years before the reform into one graph and years after the reform into another
graph. The transition year is omitted. Figures compiled using the 2006-2012 GHS data.
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Figure 4.4: Stylized Budget Constraint: Difference in Income Expansion Paths be-
tween Males and Females
Note: Hours of work increase as you move left to right (A to T)
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Figure 4.5: Lack of Access to Improved Water and Sanitation and Death due to
Diarrheal of Diseases: A Comparison Across Regions.
Adapted from: (Montgomery and Elimelech, 2007).
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Figure 4.6: Singles: Consumer Durable Goods (Phones)
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Note: On the Y-Axis: 0= Not Pension Age-Eligible, and 1=Pension Age-Eligible.
YES=Owns at least one; No=Does not own any.
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Figure 4.7: Married: Consumer Durable Goods (Phones)
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Note: On the Y-Axis: 0= Not Pension Age-Eligible, and 1=Pension Age-Eligible.
YES=Owns at least one; No=Does not own any.
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Figure 4.8: Singles: Consumer Durable Goods (Television or Radio)
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Note: On the Y-Axis: 0= Not Pension Age-Eligible, and 1=Pension Age-Eligible.
YES=Owns at least one; No=Does not own any.
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Figure 4.9: Married: Consumer Durable Goods (Television or Radio)
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Note: On the Y-Axis: 0= Not Pension Age-Eligible, and 1=Pension Age-Eligible.
YES=Owns at least one; No=Does not own any.
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4.9 Tables
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
MALE FEMALE
Not Not
Eligible Eligible Eligible Eligible
Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd
Age 55.36 3.82 67.19 4.19 54.24 2.88 66.37 4.52
Education (Yrs) 6.87 4.88 5.83 4.98 6.42 4.73 4.80 4.62
%White 0.13 0.34 0.17 0.38 0.10 0.31 0.12 0.32
%African 0.68 0.47 0.67 0.47 0.72 0.45 0.74 0.44
%Asian/Indian 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.15
%Single 0.08 0.27 0.04 0.20 0.17 0.37 0.12 0.32
%Married 0.82 0.38 0.79 0.41 0.51 0.50 0.36 0.48
%Divorced/widowed 0.10 0.31 0.17 0.38 0.32 0.47 0.53 0.50
Household Size 4.47 2.60 4.33 2.87 4.60 2.65 4.37 2.72
Presence of a child 0.59 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.64 0.48 0.61 0.49
# of children 1.40 1.67 1.30 1.79 1.58 1.75 1.56 1.80
Urban 0.67 0.47 0.59 0.49 0.62 0.49 0.53 0.50
N 13,857 10,801 12,312 15,116
Note: Author’s calculations from 2006-2012 General Household Survey (GHS)
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Table 4.2: Adult Food Security Responses by Age-Eligibility Status and Gender
Single Males Single Females Married
Both Only Only Both
Not Not not Husband Wife are
Eligible Eligible Eligible Eligible Eligible Eligible Eligible Eligible
Never 76.94 82.41 76.76 82.58 85.74 83.56 86.10 90.45
Seldom 5.72 4.66 5.31 4.80 3.75 4.93 2.54 3.10
Sometimes 12.05 9.80 13.57 10.32 8.18 9.44 9.15 5.66
Often 3.69 2.11 2.94 1.56 1.57 1.67 1.78 0.50
Always 1.61 1.02 1.43 0.74 0.77 0.41 0.42 0.29
N 5,155 2,939 12,318 15,117 7,522 2,700 1,180 5,162
Note: Author’s calculations from 2006-2012 General Household Survey (GHS)
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Table 4.3: Children’s Food Security Responses by Age-Eligibility Status and Gender
Single Males Single Females Married
Both Only Only Both
Not Not not Husband wife are
Eligible Eligible Eligible Eligible Eligible Eligible Eligible Eligible
Never 79.05 81.07 76.52 81.42 83.14 81.42 83.26 88.06
Seldom 5.23 4.81 5.06 5.00 4.40 5.77 2.59 3.41
Sometimes 11.91 11.45 14.47 11.06 9.88 10.10 11.11 7.49
Often 2.79 1.76 2.67 1.69 1.80 2.08 2.59 0.74
Always 1.02 0.92 1.29 0.83 0.78 0.63 0.46 0.30
N 2,258 1,310 8,840 10,543 7,095 1,733 657 2,697
Note: Author’s calculations from 2006-2012 General Household Survey (GHS)
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Table 4.4: Estimated Effects of Pension Age-Eligibility on Adults’ Food Security
Specification: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Males’ Eligibility -0.143 -0.156 -0.159
(0.163) (0.163) (0.163)
Males’ Eligibility X Married 0.064 0.080 0.084
(0.160) (0.161) (0.161)
Married 1.849∗∗ 1.944∗∗ 2.081∗∗
(0.880) (0.944) (1.023)
Females’ Eligibility 0.265∗∗ 0.267∗∗ 0.266∗∗
(0.104) (0.104) (0.104)
Females’ Eligibility X Married -0.031 -0.043 -0.041
(0.114) (0.115) (0.115)
Household Size -0.065∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012)
No. of children 0.005 0.008
(0.019) (0.019)
Presence of Eligible Co-residents 0.247∗∗
(0.108)
N 45,431 45,431 45,431
Household Controls No Yes Yes
Province Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is food security status for adults in the household.
Estimates are produced using ordered logit on a four point scale: 0=Always,
1= Often, 2=Sometimes, 3=Never, and 4=Never go hungry because there
was not enough food. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Sample
is restricted to male and female head of households aged 50 to 75. Control
variables are education (yrs), rural/urban status, year dummies, age dummy
for males and a quadratic for females, household size, number of children,
population groups (White, Black, Coloured, Asian/Indian), and presence of
other eligible co-residents (non-spousal members)∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗
p<0.1.
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Table 4.5: Estimated Effects of Pension Age-Eligibility on Children’s Food Security
Specification: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Males’ Eligibility -0.319 -0.351 -0.351
(0.263) (0.265) (0.265)
Males’ Eligibility X Married 0.234 0.271 0.272
(0.256) (0.257) (0.257)
Married 0.273 0.298 0.303
(1.377) (1.383) (1.382)
Females’ Eligibility 0.257∗∗ 0.251∗∗ 0.251∗∗
(0.114) (0.114) (0.114)
Females’ Eligibility X Married -0.014 -0.026 -0.025
(0.139) (0.139) (0.139)
Household Size -0.046∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014)
No. of children -0.050∗∗ -0.049∗∗
(0.021) (0.021)
Presence of Eligible Co-residents 0.071
(0.125)
N 28,149 28,149 28,149
Household Controls No Yes Yes
Province Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is food security status for children in the house-
hold. Estimates are produced using ordered logit on a four point scale:
0=Always, 1= Often, 2=Sometimes, 3=Never, and 4=Never go hungry be-
cause there was not enough food. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Sample is restricted to male and female head of households aged 50 to 75.
Control variables are education (yrs), rural/urban status, year dummies,
age dummy for males and a quadratic for females, household size, number
of children, population groups (White, Black, Coloured, Asian/Indian), and
presence of other eligible co-residents (non-spousal members)∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗
p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table 4.6: Estimated Effects of Pension Age-Eligibility on Household Size
Specification: Household Size No. of Children
Males’ Eligibility -0.086 -0.073
(0.153) (0.085)
Males’ Eligibility X Married 0.101 0.087
(0.151) (0.083)
Married 1.046 1.031
(1.016) (0.775)
Females’ Eligibility 0.047 0.084
(0.104) (0.068)
Females’ Eligibility X Married -0.152 -0.123∗
(0.113) (0.073)
N 45,431 45,431
Province Effects Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is Column 1: household size and Column 2: num-
ber of children in the household. Estimates are produced using OLS Stan-
dard errors are shown in parentheses. Sample is restricted to male and fe-
male head of households aged 50 to 75. Control variables are education (yrs),
rural/urban status, year dummies, age dummy for males and a qudratic for
females, population groups (White, Black, Coloured, Asian/Indian), and
presence of other eligible co-residents (non-spousal members)∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗
p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table 4.7: Definitions of Unimproved and Improved Water Supply and Sanitation
Status Water Supply Sanitation
Unimproved/basic (1) Unprotected well (1) No toilet facilities
(2) Unprotected spring (2) Bucket latrines (waste is manually removed)
(3)Tanker/truck water (3) Public latrines
(4) Rivers, canals, ditches (4) Latrines with an open pit
(5) Hanging latrines
Improved (1) Household connection (1) Connection to a public sewer
(2) Public standpipe (2) Connection to a septic system
(3) Borehole (3) Pour-flush latrine
(4) Protected well (4) Covered pit latrine
(5) Rainwater collection (5) Ventilated pit latrine
(6) Protected spring
Source:(WHO/UNICEF, 2000)
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Table 4.8: Variable Definitions: Categories of Water-, Sanitation-, and Hygiene-
Related Diseases
Category Definition
Waterborne: caused by the ingestion of water that is contaminated
by human or animal wastes (excreta or urine) containing
pathogenic bacteria or viruses. Associated with this includes
typhoid, amoebic and bacillary dysentery, cholera, and other
diarrheal diseases.
Water-based: caused by parasites that are found in intermediate organ-
isms that live in water. Examples of the associated diseases
include schistosomiasis and dracunculiasis.
Water-related: caused by organisms whose life cycle is associated with in-
sects that breed or live in water; includes malaria, yellow
fever, dengue fever, and lymphatic filariasis.
Excreta-related: caused by direct or indirect contact with the pathogens asso-
ciated with excreta carriers breeding in excreta. Associated
diseases include trachoma.
Water collection and
storage:
caused by contamination of water that occurs during collec-
tion of water or after, often because of poor water collection,
or use of open containers, or poor handling and storage.
Toxin-related: associated with toxic (example, cyanobacteria), which are
linked to eutrophication of surface-water; causes diseases,
such as gastrointestinal and hepatic illnesses.
Sources: Eisenberg et al. (2001), Maier et al. (2009), Chorus et al. (1999), and Montgomery and
Elimelech (2007)
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Table 4.9: Variable Definitions: Categories of Drinking Water Sources
Category Definition
Piped water: It is also referred to as household connection in the dwelling.
It is a water service pipe connected with in-house plumbing.
Piped water in the yard is also referred to as yard connection
and is defined as piped water connection to taps placed in
the yard (outside the house).
Public tap: Consists of multiple taps in a public water station where
people can collect water.
Borehole: Is described as a deep hole that has been bored or drilled,
with the intention of reaching groundwater supplies. These
boreholes are constructed with casings, or pipes to prevent
small diameter holes from collapsing in and also to protect
the water sources from infiltration by run-off water.
Water is delivered though pumps, which are powered by
human, wind, electric, or diesel power. More often they are
protected by a platform to lead spilled water away from the
boreholes and also to prevent run-off water from infiltrating
back.
A well: A type of well that is common is the dug well. It is an
excavation with a diameter large enough to accommodate
one or more people with shovels digging down to reach the
water table. Water is often drawn up using containers, such
as buckets that are raised mechanically or by hand.
It can either be protected, such that there is a cover on it,
or a well lining or casing that is raised above the ground to
divert spilled water from it. Some wells, however, are not
covered.
Spring: Is a result of surface water that has infiltrated to the earth’s
surface.
Rainwater: Rainwater refers to rain that is harvested from surfaces such
as a roof or a ground collection area and stored in contain-
ers/tank.
Tanker: Water that is trucked into communities for sale using tanker
trucks.
Stream/river/dam/pool: These are forms of surface water located above ground.
Sources: http://www.wssinfo.org/definitions-methods/watsan-categories/
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Table 4.10: Variable Definitions: Sanitation (Toilet Types) Categories
Category Definition
Flush toilet: There are two distinct types of flush toilets: one that uses a hold-
ing tank (cistern) for flushing water and has a water seal (a U-
shaped pipe below the seat) which prevents the passage of odor;
and the other (pour flush toilet) that does not have a holding
tank and uses water poured by hand for flushing. They are either
connected to a piped sewer system or to a septic tank.
A piped sewer system/sewerage is a system of sewer pipes designed
to collect and remove human waste from the household environ-
ment for disposal/treatment. It consists of facilities for collecting,
pumping, treating and disposal of the waste.
A septic tank is a collecting place for waste. It consists of a water-
tight settling tank, normally located underground and away from
the house or the toilet. The treated effluent is either discharged
into a sewer system or seeps into the ground through a leaching
pit. In an unimproved case, human waste is instead flushed to the
street, a ditch, or an open sewer.
A pit latrine: It can either be ventilated or not. A ventilated pit latrine is a dry
latrine that is ventilated with a pipe that extends above the roof
of the latrine. The top end of the ventilation pipe is often covered
with a netting or a gauze mesh, while a non-ventilated pit latrine
does not have the ventilation pipe.
Pit latrine with/without cover: This is also a dry pit latrine where
either the pit is fully covered by a slab or platform that is fitted
with a squatting hole or a seat. The platforms are often made
from solid material such as concrete, cement or logs with earth
or mud, such that the pit’s contents are not exposed other than
through the squatting hole or seat. On the other hand, a pit
latrine without a cover is just a rudimentary hole in the ground
for waste collection.
A bucket toilet: Involves the use of a bucket (or any other container) for collection
of human waste, which is periodically removed for treatment or
disposal.
None/offsite: This implies lack of toilet facilities. More often human waste is
deposited on the ground and covered with a layer of earth, or is
wrapped in a bag and thrown into the garbage, or defecation is
done into surface water such as rivers, streams or on the beach.
Sources: http://www.wssinfo.org/definitions-methods/watsan-categories/
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Table 4.11: Water Sources by Age-Eligibility Status and Gender
Single Males Single Females Married
Both Only Only Both
Not Not not Husband wife are
Eligible Eligible Eligible Eligible Eligible Eligible Eligible Eligible
Tap in dwelling, or on site, or in yard 68.94 67.61 70.59 66.51 75.92 67.11 75.29 73.60
Neighbor’s tap or public tap 22.17 22.42 21.06 22.99 15.27 21.52 15.08 15.25
Borehole on site or communal, or water 1.73 2.28 1.66 2.39 2.34 2.70 2.63 3.10
-carrier/tanker, or rain-water tank on site
Well or spring 6.77 7.38 6.41 7.78 6.11 8.30 6.27 7.36
Flowing water /stream/river/dam/pool/ 0.41 0.31 0.28 0.33 0.36 0.37 0.42 0.70
or stagnant water
N 5,155 2,939 12,318 15,117 7,522 2,700 1,180 5,162
Note: Author’s calculations from 2006-2012 General Household Survey (GHS)
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Table 4.12: Toilet Facilities by by Age-Eligibility Status and Gender
Single Males Single Females Married
Both Only Only Both
Not Not not Husband wife are
Eligible Eligible Eligible Eligible Eligible Eligible Eligible Eligible
Flush toilet (public sewage) 51.31 50.26 49.79 44.68 59.96 48.11 61.50 58.68
Flush toilet(septic tank) 4.34 3.48 3.48 2.63 4.95 4.34 5.71 4.18
Chemical toilet 0.49 0.65 0.68 0.73 0.46 0.71 0.34 0.43
Pit latrine with ventilation 12.51 15.46 14.38 16.63 10.76 15.91 7.84 12.54
Pit latrine without ventilation 22.71 22.41 23.75 27.67 18.56 24.93 19.51 20.30
Bucket toilet 1.67 1.17 1.55 1.32 1.35 1.09 0.94 0.80
No toilet on site 6.97 6.57 6.37 6.35 3.71 4.90 4.17 3.07
N 5,155 2,939 12,318 15,117 7,522 2,700 1,180 5,162
Note: Author’s calculations from 2006-2012 General Household Survey (GHS)
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Table 4.13: Estimated Effects of Pension Age-Eligibility on Water Quality
Specification: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Males’ Eligibility 0.054 0.053 0.073
(0.167) (0.167) (0.168)
Males’ Eligibility X Married -0.208 -0.205 -0.208
(0.163) (0.163) (0.163)
Married -7.711 -7.691 -7.679
(4.805) (4.807) (4.802)
Females’ Eligibility -0.033 -0.034 -0.049
(0.110) (0.110) (0.111)
Females’ Eligibility X Married -0.106 -0.106 -0.104
(0.117) (0.117) (0.117)
Urban 1.157∗∗∗ 1.156∗∗∗ 1.141∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.071)
Presence of Eligible Co-residents 0.134 0.135
(0.117) (0.117)
Males’ Eligibility X Urban -0.096
(0.107)
Females’ Eligibility X Urban 0.075
(0.090)
N 45,431 45,431 45,431
Province Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is household source of drinking water. Estimates
are produced using ordered logit on a five point scale: 4=Tap water in
dwelling, or on site, or in yard, 3= neighbor’s tap or public tap, 2= borehole
on site or communal borehole, or water-carrier/tanker or rain-water tank on
site, 1= well or spring, 0=flowing water /stream/river/dam/pool/ or stag-
nant water – with higher values denoting better drinking water sources.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Sample is restricted to male
and female head of households aged 50 to 75. Control variables are educa-
tion (yrs), rural/urban status, year dummies, age dummy for males and a
quadratic for females, household size, number of children, population groups
(White, Black, Coloured, Asian/Indian), and presence of other eligible co-
residents (non-spousal members)∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
Copyright c© Steve M. M. Muchiri, 2016.
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Table 4.14: Estimated Effects of Pension Age-Eligibility on Sanitation
Specification: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Males’ Eligibility -0.032 -0.032 0.025
(0.111) (0.111) (0.113)
Males’ Eligibility X Married -0.147 -0.147 -0.157
(0.105) (0.105) (0.105)
Married 0.074 0.108 0.088
(0.904) (0.917) (0.958)
Females’ Eligibility 0.111∗ 0.111∗ 0.113∗
(0.065) (0.065) (0.067)
Females’ Eligibility X Married 0.019 0.019 0.020
(0.078) (0.078) (0.078)
Urban 1.058∗∗∗ 1.057∗∗∗ 1.107∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.061)
Presence of Eligible Co-residents 0.052 0.053
(0.086) (0.086)
Males’ Eligibility X Urban -0.197∗∗
(0.087)
Females’ Eligibility X Urban -0.012
(0.074)
N 45,431 45,431 45,431
Province Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is household toilet facility. Estimates are pro-
duced using ordered logit on an eight point scale: 0=No toilet on site,
1=bucket toilet, 2=pit latrine without ventilation, 3=pit latrine with ven-
tilation, 5=chemical toilet, 6=flush toilet that deposits waste to a septic
tank, 7=flush toilet that deposit to the public sewageh. Standard errors
are shown in parentheses. Sample is restricted to male and female head
of households aged 50 to 75. Control variables are education (yrs), ru-
ral/urban status, year dummies, age dummy for males and a quadratic
for females, household size, number of children, population groups (White,
Black, Coloured, Asian/Indian), and presence of other eligible co-residents
(non-spousal members)∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table 4.15: Estimated Effects of Pension Age-Eligibility on Ownership of Consumer
Durable Goods
Specification: Phones Phones TV/Radio TV/Radio
Males’ Eligibility -0.031 -0.031 -0.001 -0.001
(0.019) (0.019) (0.010) (0.010)
Males’ Eligibility X Married 0.011 0.011 -0.004 -0.004
(0.019) (0.019) (0.010) (0.010)
Married -0.410 -0.369 -0.260 -0.248
(0.513) (0.495) (0.319) (0.317)
Females’ Eligibility -0.017 -0.015 -0.000 0.001
(0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007)
Females’ Eligibility X Married 0.030∗∗ 0.028∗∗ -0.005 -0.006
(0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008)
Urban 0.019∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Males’ Eligibility X Urban -0.028∗∗ -0.027∗∗ -0.012∗ -0.011∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006)
Females’ Eligibility X Urban 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
Presence of Eligible Co-residents 0.006 0.007
(0.014) (0.007)
N 45,431 45,431 45,431 45,431
Province Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is ownership of household durable goods. Estimates pre-
sented are marginal effects produced using a logit model where 1=ownership of at
least one of the named household goods, otherwise 0. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses. Sample is restricted to male and female head of households aged 50 to 75.
Control variables are education (yrs), rural/urban status, year dummies, age dummy
for males and a quadratic for females, household size, number of children, popula-
tion groups (White, Black, Coloured, Asian/Indian), and presence of other eligible
co-residents (non-spousal members)∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table 4.16: Estimated Effects of Pension Age-Eligibility on Aggregated Measures
Specification: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Males’ Eligibility -0.089 -0.092 -0.093
(0.068) (0.067) (0.067)
Males’ Eligibility X Married 0.017 0.016 0.017
(0.064) (0.063) (0.063)
Married 0.004 0.016 0.044
(0.231) (0.225) (0.232)
Females’ Eligibility 0.100∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
Females’ Eligibility X Married -0.044 -0.043 -0.042
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Males’ Eligibility X Urban -0.156∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
Females’ Eligibility X Urban -0.050∗∗ -0.052∗∗ -0.052∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Household Size 0.081∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
No. of children -0.091∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Presence of Eligible Co-residents 0.073∗∗
(0.033)
N 45,431 45,431 45,431
Household Controls No Yes Yes
Province Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable is an aggregated measure that includes, food
secuity, water source, sanitation, and ownership of duarble goods. Estimates
are produced using a linear model . Standard errors are shown in parentheses
and clustered at the household level. Sample is restricted to male and female
head of households aged 50 to 75. Control variables are education (yrs),
rural/urban status, year dummies, age dummy for males and a quadratic
for females, household size, number of children, population groups (White,
Black, Coloured, Asian/Indian), and presence of other eligible co-residents
(non-spousal members)∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion
In this dissertation, we study the impact of a large cash transfer on a number of
selected outcomes using the South African State Old Age Pension (OAP). The second
chapter of this dissertation highlights the significance of the pension to South African
households and also discusses a 2008 OAP reform that reduced, in steps, the minimum
pension eligibility age. This reform provided us with a natural experiment and an
opportunity to evaluate potential effects of such a large cash transfer based on a policy
intervention rather than relying on cross-individual variation in eligibility/pension
receipt, which is likely to be biased by unobserved characteristics. In chapter 3,
we examine the impact of OAP age-eligibility on the labor force participation of
older men. We acknowledge that it would be ideal to evaluate the impact of pension
receipt, itself, on labor force participation. Unfortunately pension take-up conditional
on age-eligibility is endogenous, but the eligibility is not because it is imposed by the
government.
Using the General Household Survey (GHS), we find that, while pension eligi-
bility does not stipulate that recipients should not work, pension age-eligibility has a
strong negative impact on labor force participation at the eligibility age. We conclude
that this observation is an indication that OAP creates incentives for older workers
to withdraw from labor force and that the reform in particular made it easier for
younger workers to withdraw from the labor force.
Chapter 4 uses the South African Old Age Pension (OAP) to estimate the pro-
gram’s age-eligibility impact on consumption of selected items, namely food security,
quality of drinking water and access to improved sanitation facilities, and ownership
of household durable goods. Our results demonstrate that pension age-eligibility does
have a positive impact; however, we observe this positive impact on selected outcomes
for females, not for males. We find these results to be consistent with the bargaining
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models of the household which predict individuals’ bargaining power increases with
an increase in the fraction of household income. In the context of this dissertation, the
increase in women’s income share relative to men’s when they become age-eligible,
more likely increases their bargaining power within the household and as a result
causes the observed results. This positive impact is consistent with other studies,
such as Duflo (2003), that have been used to argue that cash transfers in the hands
of women are used more productively than those in the hands of males.
One of the shortcomings of our data is that we do not observe hours worked.
With the availability of information on hours worked, further research can be con-
ducted to explore the impact of OAP on both labor force participation as well as
the number of hours of work. In addition, findings from chapter 4 could be explored
further with a panel data where we would observe households before and after a
household head becomes pension age-eligible.
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